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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
EFFECTIVE KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE
ORGANIZATIONS
by
Arvind Gudi
Florida International University, 2009
Miami, Florida
Professor Irma Becerra-Fernandez, Major Professor
Natural and man-made disasters have gained attention at all levels of policymaking in recent years. Emergency management tasks are inherently complex and
unpredictable, and often require coordination among multiple organizations across
different levels and locations. Effectively managing various knowledge areas and the
organizations involved has become a critical emergency management success factor.
However, there is a general lack of understanding about how to describe and assess the
complex nature of emergency management tasks and how knowledge integration can
help managers improve emergency management task performance.
The purpose of this exploratory research was first, to understand how emergency
management operations are impacted by tasks that are complex and inter-organizational
and second, to investigate how knowledge integration as a particular knowledge
management strategy can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the emergency
tasks. Three types of specific knowledge were considered: context-specific, technologyspecific, and context-and-technology-specific.
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The research setting was the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
and the study was based on the survey responses from the participants in past EOC
activations related to their emergency tasks and knowledge areas. The data included task
attributes related to complexity, knowledge area, knowledge integration, specificity of
knowledge, and task performance. The data was analyzed using multiple linear
regressions and path analyses, to (1) examine the relationships between task complexity,
knowledge integration, and performance, (2) the moderating effects of each type of
specific knowledge on the relationship between task complexity and performance, and (3)
the mediating role of knowledge integration.
As per theory-based propositions, the results indicated that overall component
complexity and interactive complexity tend to have a negative effect on task
performance. But surprisingly, procedural rigidity tended to have a positive effect on
performance in emergency management tasks. Also as per our expectation, knowledge
integration had a positive relationship with task performance. Interestingly, the
moderating effects of each type of specific knowledge on the relationship between task
complexity and performance were varied and the extent of mediation of knowledge
integration depended on the dimension of task complexity.
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1. Introduction
Natural and man-made disasters have gained attention at all levels of policymaking particularly following the sobering lessons of Hurricane Katrina, one of the most
significant natural disasters in the United States in recent history (Harris 2005).
Depending on the nature of the disaster, failure to successfully respond to the emergency
incident can pose severe danger and risk to the community at-large and the personnel
involved in the emergency response activities. Furthermore as our technology develops
and expands in its applicability, experience shows that we create sophisticated systems
and organizations for managing systems and tasks related to the operations in emergency
response organizations. Analysis and investigations of the response activities and
mechanisms following Hurricane Katrina, seem to indicate systemic flaws that existed
even prior to the disaster (GAO, 2006) and there have been repeated failures in
emergency response management at various levels (Becerra-Fernandez, Prietula, Madey,
Rodriguez, Valerdi, Wright, 2008). Perhaps, what is even more disturbing is the
observation that the lessons learned from Katrina were similar to those mentioned after
Hurricane Andrew, which occurred ten years earlier (Becerra-Fernandez & Prietula,
2006). As such, there is a critical need to try to minimize the impacts of disasters by
improving the emergency response operations.
Emergency management tasks have become increasingly complex and interorganizational (Comfort et al., 2004; Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2007). Such tasks are
more prone to failure and hence this complexity has made it difficult to manage the
emergency tasks. In the face of such challenging situations, integration of the key areas
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of knowledge is the crucial requirement for successful task execution. Thus, effectively
managing various knowledge areas and the organizations involved has become a critical
emergency management success factor. However, there is a lack of theory and tools that
organizations can use to assess and improve emergency management success through
effectively managing task complexity and knowledge integration (Becerra-Fernandez,
Xia, Gudi, & Rocha, 2008). The purpose of this research is to fill that gap by examining
how the integration of specific knowledge can improve the inter-organizational task
performance in emergency operations.
This study is based on a review of relevant theoretical and empirical studies of
disaster operations, knowledge management, knowledge integration, complex systems,
and system accidents. Each of these areas is rich in its corresponding discipline but
seems disconnected with the literature in the other areas. One of the theoretical
motivations of this work will be to expand the emerging literature in the areas of task
complexity and knowledge integration with a view to apply relevant theories in the field
of emergency management.
For many years, researchers, practitioners, and thought-leaders have struggled
with the notion of complex systems and how complexity theory might apply to social and
organizational change. As research in these areas progresses, we might be able to gain a
better understanding of the underlying issues in the management of inter-organizational
tasks and how we can make better use of knowledge management in the domain of
emergency response organizations. The steps proposed in this study will attempt to
conceptualize the dimensions of task complexity and develop a research model that
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focuses on the relationships between task complexity, knowledge integration, and
emergency task performance.
In the following sections of the paper, the various topics that are relevant for this
study will be identified along with a review of the related literature. Emergency (or
disaster) management functions need to be studied to better understand how the changing
environment and development of technology is affecting the organization design and
structure, and in turn how it affects inter-organizational task management. With regard to
the possibility of risks of failures, we need to understand the nature of the tasks and how
the task characteristics themselves might be making them more prone to failure. In later
sections the research design will be explained along with proposed methodologies which
were employed for this research.
Researchers have attempted to explain failures or accidents at a system level
based on system characteristics of complexity and coupling (Perrow, 2004). Theories
have been proposed to overcome some of the limitations to better cope with those issues
and help improve the organizational reliability. This study views emergency response
organizations from these perspectives and explores how the use of knowledge
management (KM) strategies can improve their performance. Particularly, integration of
specific knowledge has been proposed as a KM strategy in such environments. This
study will further enable us to identify how the use of KM can benefit the organizations
and which specific tools, processes or mechanisms can be applied.
The site for this research is the Miami-Dade County Emergency Operations
Center. Current research has attempted to touch upon broad concepts that apply to
emergency environments in different organization settings, but may not have reached the

3

heart of the issues that we contemplate in this study. We expect that this work will
provide useful insight and guidelines for emergency managers responsible for making
crucial decisions in dynamic environments. We hope to provide them a methodology to
evaluate their options, so that the choices they make are proactive, informed and
deliberate, rather than simple enactments of past experiences. We anticipate that this
research will allow us to contribute and offer insights towards improved and more
effective performance.
1.1 Emergency Operations Center activation facility
We had the opportunity to visit the Miami-Dade EOC on a number of occasions
for meetings and interviews with the emergency coordinators and other officials, as
observers of their practice drills as well as activations in preparation for disaster events.
In this section, we provide a snapshot of the EOC activation facility and our impressions
of their work functions and environment. We highlight our experience of one particular
visit that led to the epiphany which made us realize the significance and implications of
our research project.
We were led into a fairly large room and a quick glance revealed that it was
designed and furnished in special ways. Three large elongated tables were arranged in
the center of the room; each table was equipped with 14-16 workstations and
corresponding chairs, with two stations at the head of each table. Name plates of various
organizations and agencies were neatly displayed at each workstation which was also
equipped with a computer, two telephones (one conventional, and another customized),
and a couple of manuals and instruction sets. One end of the room had seating
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arrangements for 8-10 people in each of two rows and the other end had a raised
platform for four section managers, a podium with a microphone lending an aura of
authority and orderliness. There were fifteen ceiling-mounted monitors and each of the
adjoining walls was fitted with five television screens. The emergency management
official who had sponsored the visit for our research team was beginning to explain that
this was the central activation facility at the Miami-Dade EOC. Outside it was a typical
warm summer day in South Florida.
Flash forward August 29, 2006. We were back in the same activation room -- this
time as research observers for the activation procedures for Hurricane Ernesto. Most of
the workstations were now manned by the representatives of the respective organizations
and government agencies and regional EOC representatives were also present. The head
of each table was occupied by the Miami-Dade EOC functional branch manager who
also periodically updated the status boards on the overhead monitors. The television sets
were muted but linked us to the outside world through different broadcast channels.
"Task complexity", "knowledge integration", and "emergency task performance"
were no longer empty words on a sheet of paper or fancy ideas in a researcher's mind.
These terms had sprung to life in this activation room and as we became aware of the
gradual deterioration of the weather conditions outside, we realized there was serious
work to be done. The faint buzz of telephone discussions, the chatter of computer
keyboards, and the furtive glances at the television screens conveyed an ambiance of
anxiety and apprehension; yet we could sense the urgency and intensity of purposive
action that was evident in the expressions of these trained emergency professionals. The
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once hazy research concepts we had imagined had concretized on the landscape of South
Florida.
1.2 Research approach and terminology
The aim of this research is to refine our understanding of how emergency
response operations, undertaken by multiple organizations, are impacted by task
characteristics such as complexity and process rigidity that are unique to emergency
management and thereby present additional challenges for personnel working in these
dynamic environments. Further, the intent is to identify knowledge management
strategies which organizations could benefit from and improve their emergency
management performance.
For the purpose of consistency of terminology and conceptual development,
below are definitions of the terms introduced in this study. They will be explained in
detail in later sections along with the logical and contextual ideology relating to prior
literature as well as the context of this study.
Task complexity: This is the characteristic of the task complexity defined by three
dimensions: component complexity (comprised of personnel, teams, organizations,
machines, and computer systems), interactive complexity between different personnel
and activities, and procedural rigidity (or lack of) of the processes involved in the task.
Integration of specific knowledge: Integration of a particular area of knowledge
represents the extent to which that knowledge is shared and applied across the
organization and enables its members to better perform their tasks. In this study, three
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variations of specific knowledge are being considered: context-specific, technologyspecific, and context-and-technology specific knowledge.
Task performance: We choose to consider two dimensions of the task performance. One
is task efficiency which refers to the extent to which the task was completed in the
required time frame and within the allocated budget and resources. Second, task
effectiveness refers to the extent to which the emergency incident requirements were met
and completed satisfactorily for all participants and stakeholders.
The context of this study is the Miami-Dade County Emergency Operations
Center. Emergency management organizations, like the Emergency Operations Center
(EOC) at Miami-Dade County in the State of Florida, USA have some unique
characteristics. They are knowledge-intensive organizations, in the sense that their
operations deal with detailed scientific knowledge (such as meteorological systems) as
well as inter-organizational management of skills and experience. Because of their
mission, they must place a strong emphasis on safety, fraught with environmental
uncertainty from different aspects -- technological, social, economical, and political.
There is only so much that can be planned in advance for the possibility of occurrence of
any disaster incident. What is critical in such an environment is for managers to know
not only how their systems function, but also to learn how to quickly adapt to changing
conditions (Haeckel 1999). Emergency management in these organizations will most
likely have to deal with the issues which are the subject of this study.
The following two sets of research questions are posed. The first question deals
with the exploration of the effects of complex inter-organizational tasks on emergency
management operations. The literature related to complex systems and analysis of how
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failures can occur provides a useful and pragmatic perspective (Perrow 1999, 2004;
Sagan 1993). An implicit understanding is that successful management of these tasks is
critical for coping with the unique and distinctive issues faced in these environments.
However this understanding alone is inadequate for managing emergency operations in a
manner that will keep up with and address the emerging environmental and
phenomenological realities. Hence the second question views these issues from a
knowledge management perspective in an attempt to provide useful insights for the
academic researcher as well as the practitioner.
1.3 Research questions
1. How are emergency management operations impacted by tasks that are complex and
inter-organizational and could make them prone to failure?
2. How can knowledge management strategies be used for the successful management of
the inter-organizational tasks in emergency operations?
a) How does integration of context-specific knowledge influence the performance of
the tasks?
b) How does the integration of technology-specific knowledge influence the
performance of the tasks?
c) How does the integration of context-and-technology specific knowledge influence
the performance of the tasks?
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Emergency management
Emergency (or disaster) management has become an increasingly important topic
of research. Natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, forest fires, floods, and
other incidents can severely impact the lives of large numbers of people for extended
periods of time (GAO, 2006). Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which hit in succession in
2005, caused the displacement of some 600,000 families from their homes. The damage
caused by them extended over 90,000 square miles in five states, cost over $88 billion,
and resulted in more than 1,500 deaths (Stanton, 2007).
The literature on this topic has generally identified four phases of emergency
management processes: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation (Mushkatel &
Weschler, 1985). The focus of this study is particularly on the response and short-term
recovery phases. Preparedness includes those tasks that need to be initiated just prior to
the disaster event. The goal is to minimize the possible damage that can be caused and
includes planning activities, issuing warnings and other information to the public, and
training. The activities undertaken immediately after the event, fall under the response
phase. These usually include identification and relocation of severely affected victims,
providing emergency assistance to victims, power restoration, etc. The next phase of
emergency management, recovery includes short-term and long-term recovery. Shortterm restoration activities and long-term reconstruction efforts are both intended to
restore the conditions that existed prior to the disaster event. The purpose of the

9

mitigation phase is to reduce the impact of any future disaster events based on the
experience of the prior phases.
Scholars studying emergency management issues have adopted varied and at
times diverse streams of research to analyze emergency incidents and the subsequent
response activities. These research studies have included emerging trends and
technologies such as emergency response information systems, the importance of the
human-computer interaction and socio-technical systems, organizational structures and
configurations, and management and coordination strategies. In the remainder of this
section, we review the advances in emergency management literature over the past
decade particularly about emergency management performance and how it might relate to
notions of task complexity, complex systems, and knowledge management.
Emergency management environments are increasingly being characterized as
complex involving multi-organizational settings. Researchers are examining the
problems of inter-organizational coordination, how to increase the performance
efficiency in disaster mitigation and response, and applications to public administration
theory and practice (Comfort et al., 2004). They deal with issues related to identifying
and sharing critical information among the organizational entities and how to design
systems to achieve better coordination. The concept of complex adaptive systems is a
useful theoretical framework to explain the dynamic processes in managing the complex
technical operations. The goal of such organizations is not only to manage risk more
effectively and efficiently in the organizations, but also for the community as a whole
(Walle & Turoff 2007). We note that this is an important consideration in the decisionmaking processes of emergency response organizations.
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Regarding organizational issues, a concern that has been reported repeatedly is
that communication in large-scale emergencies has become a major challenge (Walle &
Turoff, 2007). Experience has shown that every major disaster event has the potential to
spawn off new development of sophisticated systems and technologies and organization
forms to potentially deal with future events. Since communication can prove to be a
major barrier in such complex environments, research studies have identified three major
categories that are key to developing and maintaining effective disaster communication
systems: technological, sociological, and organizational (Manoj & Baker, 2007). We
briefly review the literature pertinent to these categories in the remainder of this section.
However we believe that research studies confined to such categorizations may not be
able to provide a comprehensive view of the research objectives that we address in this
study.
Advocating the use of information and communication technology (ICT), new
emergency response systems and processes have been proposed, the emphasis being on
effective information systems which are able to provide timely and reliable information
(Walle & Turoff, 2007). A significant hurdle that emergency response organizations are
faced with is how to gain useful information and make sense of it to arrive at meaningful
decisions. Using technology as the basis, the proponents of this approach contend that
emergency responders should be able to collect, analyze, disseminate and act on key
information, thereby providing more timely and effective response for the emergency
situation.
Fiedrich and Burghardt (2007) have identified two major research areas in
application of agent technology: agent-based simulation systems which can create
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realistic post-disaster environments, and agent-based DSS which can support disaster
managers operating at various levels. Again the emphasis here is on the timeliness and
efficiency of the communication needs during disaster events. The authors argue that the
application of agent technology can support more timely and enhanced data acquisition
and coordination (Tate, 2006) which can support effective decision-making.
A research study that aims to address the critical needs of emergency response
organizations is the Project Ensayo Virtual EOC (vEOC) (Becerra-Fernandez and
Prietula, 2006; Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2007). The Ensayo vEOC project is a large,
multidisciplinary effort that is focused on building a virtual computational infrastructure
that simulates the various functions and processes of an emergency management event.
One of the important contributions of this research will also help better educate
emergency management personnel as to how to effectively and efficiently deal with such
events, which inevitably will continue to occur.
Emphasizing the role of personnel in emergency response organizations, we note
a research stream related to human factors and the interaction between humans and
machines. Researchers are beginning to point out that design challenges for human
factors and human-computer interaction are particularly relevant in emergency
management systems (e.g., Carver & Turoff 2007, Harrald et al. 2007). They contend
that the human and the computer need to work together with other people and computer
systems sharing information to manage the crisis and to support victims after the event.
According to them, technological requirements should be driven by user requirements as
a result of lessons learned originating from a user-centered systemic approach. This
research stream also examines the attributes of automation and how it affects tasks,
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particularly the notion of situational awareness (Sarter & Woods, 1995) which is
considered a critical aspect in managing complexity. Automation undoubtedly will help
to eliminate some routine aspects of the tasks, but ultimately the knowledge and
experience of the emergency personnel lead to the successful execution of the tasks.
Thus human response to extreme events (or large-scale emergencies) is an
important element in this research topic. Research has shown that the success of
emergency response operations would depend on many considerations one of which is
the recognition that response personnel need to undertake a range of tasks varying in their
degree of improvisation (Mendonca et al. 2007). Understandably, the greater the degree
of improvisation required for a task, the less the possible dependence of the personnel on
automation. ICT systems can be built to support the personnel in accomplishing the tasks
and an important consideration is the technological systems are built to enhance
organizational agility (Harrald 2006). These systems should aid the personnel in their
organizations to undertake the activities that underlie the tasks, some of which can be
cognitive, behavioral, and communication (Mendonca et al. 2007).
Research in organization science is considering issues dealing with reliability in
organizational working conditions that can be hazardous and unpredictable (Weick et al.,
1999). Researchers are suggesting the possibility of new organizational forms for better
control and efficiency such as the incident command system (ICS) (Bigley & Roberts,
2001). The ICS is a particular approach to management of highly reliable temporary
organizations that has been employed by many public safety professionals in emergency
response organizations. It has enabled the organizations to be flexible and reliable in
complex and volatile task environments. This approach is of particular interest in this
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study because the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center is structured following the
ICS guidelines.
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is the first standardized
management approach that attempts to unify Federal, state, and local lines of government
in times of emergency response activities (DHS, 2004). Researchers have reviewed the
use and applications of this system with a focus on the ICS within NIMS (Anderson et
al., 2004). One of the management characteristics of the ICS is modular organization, an
organizational structure which develops in a top-down modular fashion based on the size
and complexity of the incident. According to the authors, when situational complexity
increases, the organization is able to respond by expanding from the top down adding
functional responsibilities as required. For example, one of the procedures adopted at the
Miami-Dade EOC is to ramp up (or down) the activation level depending on the severity
of the disaster event thereby increasing (or decreasing) the personnel and resources
available for the emergency response operation.
2.1.1 Link to knowledge management
Some research studies on emergency management have touched upon theories
and applications of knowledge management. Since the nature of this work is using a
knowledge-based perspective, we review some of the related literature in this section. In
general, work related to knowledge management and knowledge management systems
(KMS) has considered it important to manage both tacit and explicit knowledge (Nonaka
& Takeuchi, 1995; Polanyi, 1966).

14

In emergency response environments the need to manage tacit knowledge is
critical because there is seldom sufficient explicit knowledge that exists in databases or
models to address all the events that can possibly arise (French & Turoff 2007). Some
suggested approaches are visualization aids to build a collaborative understanding of the
situation and foster shared mental models among the emergency personnel (Weick &
Sutcliffe 2001). Through such techniques it is possible for emergency personnel with
different skill sets to share their tacit knowledge expediently at critical times so that the
emergency problem can be quickly resolved.
Researchers have examined the issues of coordination in rapidly evolving
disaster response systems (Comfort et al., 2004). Increasing coordination in disaster
management goes beyond just providing information to response agents. Hence the
mechanisms used for coordination of information in normal circumstances would fall
short in emergency situations. The authors point out that it is also important to identify
the core information, including severity and time of incident, and share it with others.
This is an important factor since in disaster situations the sooner the core information is
identified and shared, the faster will be the response. This finding is of particular interest
to us since this work aims to investigate the influence of knowledge integration on
emergency task performance.
Organization theories have been examined to get a better understanding about
emergent response groups and how they efficiently coordinate knowledge for improving
disaster response (Majchrzak et al., 2007). Applying organization theory about
knowledge coordination in groups, the authors in this study seek to learn about the
internal dynamics of emergent response groups. From a theoretical perspective, they
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examine: the role of expertise in task assignment, how groups function when credibility
cannot be validated, and how the expertise is coordinated. In emergency management,
groups can be quickly assembled based on the disaster situation and the nature of
response required. Different members of the group can have varied background in their
professional experience and skills in dealing with emergencies. Hence emergency
response organizations have to acknowledge that these groups need to function
cohesively without prior validation of the credibility of each member and then provide
the environment whereby the expertise is coordinated within the group effectively. We
note that this is one of the challenges of the Miami-Dade EOC.
Effective knowledge and information management between government agencies
and the public is important in emergency management (Schellong & Langenberg, 2007).
Presenting the case of Miami-Dade County, which implemented a multi-jurisdictional
and channel environment (the 311-portal), the authors of this research study show how it
was successfully used during Hurricane Wilma. They argue that such a setting enhances
the organization's knowledge sharing effectiveness, which is important at all political
levels, especially when disasters occur.
An important element of emergency response organizations is the responsibility
of keeping the public informed about impending disaster situations, as well as issuing
specific instructions and warnings to the community. Emergency response personnel
often times depend on the cooperation of citizens for accomplishing their tasks (such as
evacuations). Some interesting developments have been citizen-led online forums, public
warning systems, and open source disaster management systems which are indicative of
new avenues for knowledge management in unique emergency situations.
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A typical illustrative citizen-led online forum is one that emerged after the August
2005 Hurricane Katrina disaster (Palen et al., 2007). These forums were generated by the
public to find missing people, to offer and seek shelter, employment, and other forms of
relief. The authors point out that these forums are indicative of the reach of the Internet
(Preece, 2000), and how public involvement can be expanded regardless of physical
distance from the disaster area. From the knowledge management perspective, the
forums create a means for sharing knowledge, learning from stories and experiences, and
building the knowledge base which can be useful in preparation for future events.
The idea of public warning is about the sharing of information about threats and
hazards. Botterell and Addams-Moring (2007) have discussed how public warning
systems have developed in the networked-age serving the functions of warning others and
enlisting help which become essential in the community during and after disasters. The
challenges faced by emergency response organizations would be how to ensure the
validity and authencity if such systems were freely deployed in the community.
A recent development in global disaster management is free and open source
disaster management systems. In their assessment of "Sahana"1, the authors state that the
key characteristics of the open-access approach are firstly low-cost deployment and
secondly easy adaptability (Currion, De Silva, & Van De Walle, 2007). Hence, they
argue that open source emergency management systems will prove to be important in
future humanitarian operations.

1

Sahana is an open source disaster management system developed in Sri Lanka following the Tsunami
disaster in 2004
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2.1.2 Challenges in emergency operations
When we consider work in highly dynamic environments and especially when the
complexity is relatively high (such as in emergency management), some unique factors
begin to surface which need consideration. These factors are related to organization
structure, managerial strategies, technological infrastructure, and mechanisms of
coordination. We describe below some of the key challenges in emergency environments
and why further study and analysis and is called for in these research areas. These factors
are significant for the following reasons:
1) The events that trigger emergency management operations are rare and diverse and
there is no single comprehensive plan that can be devised ahead of time to cope with
the next incident (Becerra-Fernandez et al. 2007). Emergency managers are faced
with the dilemma that every event is unique and "one size does not fit all" when it
comes to task management planning and methodology.
2) The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is the organization which is the site for all
emergency management operations and functional responsibilities. Many
assumptions usually made in the organizational context with regard to issues such as
resource planning, communications, chain of command, etc. may not hold here
(Samii, Van Hassenhove, Kumar, & Becerra-Fernandez, 2002a). During an
emergency, the participation of representatives from different organizations is
transitory. Communication mechanisms could be instituted formally, but the stressful
conditions during an emergency might cause the participants to revert to informal
means of communication (such as phone, e-mail etc.). For similar reasons, the welldefined chain of command at the EOC might be construed to be fluid and evolving.
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3) The nature of emergency situations is such that decisions have to be made quickly
many decisions may have to be implemented immediately (Becerra-Fernandez &
Preitula 2006). Given this mandate, organizations would usually rely on policies and
procedures dealing with communication, authority, delegation, decision criteria, etc.
which have been established, distributed, and understood prior to the incident.
Ironically many emergency events are unique and hence the extent of planning that
can be done earlier is limited. For example, an event such as a hurricane can be
unique in each occurrence in terms of speed of movement, wind speed, direction of
motion, size, amount of rainfall, and so on. The number of variables that characterize
an emergency event create practically an infinite number of possible combinations,
such as the responses required for a fast moving "dry" hurricane versus a slow
moving "wet" hurricane.
4) Many of the participants in the EOC for a particular incident may be "first time"
entrants because emergency events do not have a regular pattern or schedule. They
may have extensive knowledge and expertise in the organization they represent (such
as water management, electric utility, phone services, etc.) without much experience
of dealing with emergency situations. Additionally this might be the first time they
are meeting and working with the other EOC members. This is a challenge because
the situation would demand a high degree of interaction between the different
organizational representatives with severe time constraints.
5) In emergency management environments involving multiple organizations, tasks will
most likely have a high degree of complexity: component, interactive, and procedural
rigidity. Many personnel representing different organizations and agencies need to
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come together and work on the emergency tasks. Such tasks will tend to be risky and
prone to failure because decisions have to be made quickly in dangerous and stressful
circumstances. This gives rise to additional challenges to compensate for these
inherent characteristics by effective task management using adaptive techniques.
The convergence of the organizational and technological characteristics through
knowledge integration we believe will be critical for successful management of these
tasks. We believe effective integration of specific knowledge will be able to reduce the
negative impact of task complexity on emergency task performance.
Current theory to address such questions remains sparse and our present level of
understanding is inadequate when dealing with these issues (Comfort et al., 2004). When
faced with the operational challenges of conducting such operations, typically
practitioners continue to rely upon inefficient and ineffective methods such as trial and
error, and imitation (Walle & Turoff, 2007). We believe that this calls for both
theoretical and applied research to help guide the academic scholar and also to inform the
practitioner through new contributions in this research domain.
In summary, the emergency management processes before, during, and after the
event are complex, can cross inter-organizational boundaries and jurisdictions (Samii et
al., 2002a). The tasks undertaken by the emergency response organizations tend to be
complex because of the interdependence among organizations as well as the systems
involved (Comfort, Ko & Zagorecki, 2004). Decision-makers are challenged to be
flexible and adapt to the requirements of the situation as they unfold (Haeckel & Nolan
1993).
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In a later section we review in more detail the principles and methodology of the
Incident Command System (ICS), which is a particular approach of a highly reliable
temporary organization employed by many public safety officials for management of
emergency operations. Also in the Research Methodology chapter, we review the
operations and structure of the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
The focus of this study is the operations of emergency organizations dealing with
the phases related to response and short-term recovery. In the next section we review the
literature on task complexity along with the rationale for viewing the "task" as the unit of
analysis for research agendas pursuing related topics.
2.2 Task complexity
To be able to address the issues in such environments, we believe an
understanding of task complexity is important for its potential implications for research in
applied areas such as emergency response organizations. Prior literature on complexity
theory (Bar-Yam, 2003), complex systems (Fryer 2003), and complex projects (Shenhar
& Dvir 1996; Xia & Lee 2005) has attempted to develop strategies on how organizations
in general can adapt to complex environments (P. Anderson, 1999). Simon (1996)
defined a complex system as one made up of a large number of parts that have many
interactions. Thompson (1967) explains a complex organization as a set of
interdependent parts, which together make up a whole that is interdependent with some
larger environment.
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In order to situate the concept of "task" and its attributes in the context of this
work, we reflect upon Churchman's (1971) essay about "Leibnizian concept of a whole
concept". As a systems thinker, Churchman explains:
"Present world's philosophy of system design, for almost all our
conscious policy making is based on the idea of fixing up messy
situations wherever they occur. … No unit of nature can function
unless implicitly it contains all the richness of nature -- a "unit" of
nature contains all of the complexity of nature. To translate this
into modern terminology, the idea is that in the design and
evaluation of any functioning system the same set of considerations
are always involved; to ignore any consideration is to design an
incompletely functioning entity" (pp. 40-41).

We view task management as a core function in emergency operations and it is
the nexus around which the requirements for all organizational units of emergency
response organizations are conceptualized and eventually deployed. In other words, the
concept of task implicitly contains the issues and complexities of emergency operations
and the findings based on task analyses will lead us to solutions to the questions
presented in the research objectives. Anticipating that these solutions potentially could
have multiple and diverse applications in the organization, we adopt the "task" as the unit
of analysis for this research study.
Literature on task complexity has attempted to explain the characteristics of
complex tasks and identified a variety of dimensions to identify them. We review the
significant contributions of Wood (1986) and Campbell (1988) to this research stream.
Wood has defined three types of task complexity: component, coordinative, and dynamic.
Component complexity of a task depends on the number of distinct acts that need to be
executed and the number of distinct information cues that need to be processed for
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performing the acts. Coordinative complexity depends on the nature of the relationships
between task inputs and task outputs. They are represented by the form and strength of
the relationships between information cues, acts, and the products of the task. The
difficulty for coordination increases as the requirements for timing, frequency, intensity,
and location of acts become more complex.
Campbell (1986) proposes four fundamental task attributes that make a task
complex. These are explained as: (1) multiple paths -- when there are potentially
multiple ways (or paths) that lead to the goal, (2) multiple outcomes -- when there is
more than one goal (or outcome) that is desired to be reached, (3) conflicting
interdependence -- the paths and the outcomes have conflicting interdependencies, (4)
uncertain linkages -- the relationship among the paths and the outcomes are not always
clear.
The understanding of the concept of task complexity is important in such studies
because we need to clarify the potential implications for the proposed research in applied
areas such as emergency management. In a later section, we explain how we attempt to
disaggregate or "unbundle" this concept as it relates to tasks undertaken in emergency
operations. Also the primary feature that emerges in such a dynamic environment is that
task management needs to hinge around the key ingredient of agility of purpose.
It is easy to see that the increased task complexity implies that no one individual
or team can at a given time comprehend the entire disaster situation on hand. In a later
section, we introduce some relevant knowledge management strategies useful in these
conditions. Also we note that our ability to advance in science and technology continues
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unabated. This leads us to remain sanguine, that we can construct tools and design
processes for managing this complexity.
In the next section, we discuss the conceptualization of task performance in
emergency operations. The following table summarizes the various literature references
that we draw from about complexity in general and more specifically about task
complexity.
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Concept/
construct
Task
component
complexity

Task
interactive
complexity

Procedural
rigidity
OR
Coupling
(tight or
loose)

Literature references
Wood 1986, Campbell 1988, Perrow 1999, Marais, et al., 2004, Rijpma
1997, Cooke & Rohleder 2006, Shenhar & Dvir 1996
Component complexity represents the number of variables in the system;
how many business elements it needs to coordinate in the organization; the
size and number of elements and also the variety of elements.
Perrow (1984, 1999); Marais, et al., 2004; Rijpma 1997; Cooke & Rohleder,
2006
The measure of interactive complexity is the number of ways in which
components of the system can interact. It represents the number of variables
in the system, the number of relationships between the variables and the
number of feedback loops through which the variables interact. Typically,
interactive complexity increases with the technology incorporated into the
system.
Interactive complexity refers to the presence of unfamiliar or unplanned and
unexpected sequences of events in a system that is either not visible or not
immediately comprehensible.
Haeckel & Nolan, 1993
A company's complexity is a function of how many information sources it
needs, how many business elements it must coordinate and the number and
type of relationships that exist among those elements
Shenhar & Dvir, 1996
Complexity of a project depends on the size of the project, number of
elements, variety, and inter-connectedness of the parts.
Perrow (1984, 1999); Marais et al., 2004; Rijpma 1997; Cooke & Rohleder,
2006
A tightly coupled system is one that is highly interdependent: Each part of
the system is tightly linked to many other parts and therefore a change in
one part can rapidly affect the status of other parts. Tightly coupled systems
respond quickly to perturbations, but this response may be disastrous.
Loosely coupled or decoupled systems have fewer or less tight links
between parts and therefore are able to absorb failures or unplanned
behavior without destabilization.
Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996
Product designs composed of tightly coupled components will generally
require development processes carried out in a tightly coupled organization
structure coordinated by a managerial authority hierarchy, an organizational
design typically achieved within a single firm (p. 65)
Orton & Weick, 1990
Tightly coupled systems are portrayed as having responsive components
that do not act independently, whereas loosely coupled systems are
portrayed as having independent components that do not act responsively
(p.205)
Organizational outcomes of loose coupling are: persistence, buffering,
adaptability, satisfaction, and effectiveness (p. 213)

Table 1: Summary of task complexity literature review
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2.3 Task performance
In most prior studies concerned with tasks and their outcome, the focus is on the
task in question. Measures dealing with the task performance tend to be centered on the
nature of the specific task and usually not suitable for generic evaluation. A review of
literature about project management and project success revealed approaches that are
suitable for evaluating tasks in the emergency management arena.
Given that achieving targets of time, cost, scope, and quality are most highly rated
as measures of success in project management (Freeman & Beale, 1992), we need
additional criteria for evaluating the success of the outcome of emergency tasks. This is
partly due to the fact that this evaluation will also depend upon the "rater" of the task
based on different viewpoints (Belout, 1998). This is especially true in dynamic
environments when the nature of the emergency is such that amidst changing
environmental factors, multiple organizations and agencies are involved, each potentially
having their own accountabilities (PMBOK, 2000).
We propose two dimensions to evaluate the success of the task: task effectiveness
and task efficiency based on the main criteria for measuring the success of projects as
noted by Freeman and Beale (1992):
Task effectiveness refers to the extent to which the emergency incident
requirements were met. It represents the extent to which the task outcome was
satisfactory to all the participants. Equally important is how well the task was executed
without disrupting other tasks. Task efficiency refers to the extent to which the task was
completed in the required time frame and within the allocated budget and resources.
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With this background, we theorize that careful articulation of elements of task
management leading to knowledge integration may inevitably be the most reasonable
approach to turn the apparently contradictory forces riding on complexity to eventually
converge on success for the task outcome.
In the following section, the principles of Normal Accident theory and related
organizational practices are discussed along with their implications for managing
complex tasks in organizations.
2.4 Normal Accident theory and organizational practices
The Normal Accident theory related to accidents and failures in systems and
organizations further inform this research. Normal Accident theory (NAT) was initially
formulated by Perrow (1984) and later reviewed by Sagan (1993) and states that
accidents are inevitable in complex, tightly-coupled systems (such as nuclear power
plants). Interactive complexity represents the number of ways in which the system
components can interact with each other. It depends on the number of parts or
components of the system, the possible relationships between them and the presence of
feedback loops for the interactions. The premise for this theory is that system complexity
will cause unpredictable interactions between the various parts of the system which can
sometimes lead to failures, some of which can be catastrophic. Tight or loose coupling
depends on the rigidity of the design of the system with respect to time or sequence of
events. It will depend on presence of redundancies and backups, resource buffers, slack,
and flexibility of the process. Tight coupling will allow breakdowns and failures in the
system to quickly cascade to other parts. According to Perrow, a system that is complex
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and tightly-coupled is susceptible to failure and accidents; hence he calls them "normal
accidents".
Theorists like La Porte and Consolini (1998) state that serious accidents and
system failures can be prevented by implementing certain organizational practices. These
organizations adopt several strategies which can increase their reliability (Roberts & Bea,
2001), (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) and these are summarized as follows: (1) Redundancy - maintaining backups for equipment so that if one part fails then there is another to
replace it; keeping backup personnel available in case any one person is unable to
accomplish his task. (2) Simultaneous centralized and decentralized operations -decentralized decision-making allows those who are most knowledgeable about the
problem to quickly solve them. Decentralization needs to be supported by an
organizational culture of reliability which imparts to its members a clear understanding of
the operational goals and the decision premises with the underlying assumptions. The
latter is achieved by a centralized organizational structure. (3) Culture of safety and
reliability throughout the organization and a sense of high priority from management; (4)
Organizational learning -- includes knowledge of the operations, processes, and
technology. Emphasis is given on "trial-and-error" learning which implies learning from
past mistakes, constant training and a forgiving culture which can allow its members to
learn from past failures.
We draw from the principles discussed above to identify which knowledge
management strategies would be appropriate to improve performance in emergency
response organizations. The notion of knowledge integration in emergency situations is
particularly relevant for an organization to be simultaneously centralized and
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decentralized in its operations. This, we believe is in part a solution for how an
organization attempts to become adaptive to respond to complex environments as
explained in the following section.
2.4.1 The Incident Command System
To deal with complex and volatile task environments, organizations have
emphasized the need for reliability as well as being flexible and adaptive to respond to
changing conditions (Haeckel 1999). The Incident Command System (ICS) is a
particular approach of a highly reliable temporary organization employed by many public
safety officials for management of emergency operations (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).
Department of Homeland Security defines ICS as "a management system designed to
enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a
combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications
operating within a common organizational structure" (DHS, 2004).
The ICS approach is of particular interest in this work since it implies a solution
that holds the dual promise of being adaptive in a turbulent environment and at the same
offering reliable practices. One of the key themes supporting such an organizational
system is "integration" of various organizational capabilities as stated in the above
definition. In general the ICS is constructed around five major functions: command,
planning, operations, logistics, and finance/ administration. To some extent, the ICS is a
bureaucratic system which is formalized, characterized by rules, procedures, policies, and
instructions (A. I. Anderson, Compton, & Mason, 2004). The Incident commander is the
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highest ranking position within the ICS who is ultimately responsible for all activities
that take place at an incident.
Interestingly, despite being bureaucratic, the ICS serves as the basis for providing
a high degree of organizational flexibility which is required for reliable performance in
uncertain and risky circumstances (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). This is accomplished by the
ability of ICS-based organizations to rapidly coordinate diverse resources required to
complete emergency tasks characterized by high complexity and rigid time-constrained
conditions.
Researchers have explained this capability as "constrained improvisation" (A. I.
Anderson et al., 2004). First, there is acknowledgement that the incident commander and
other supervisors may not understand enough about all the details of the situations that
their subordinates may be facing. Second, to reduce problems that can be created due to
centralized structuring, supervisors provide the subordinates with a degree of latitude to
improvise since they possess the required experience, training, and resourcefulness to
adapt to the particular problem on hand. We advocate knowledge management strategies,
particularly integration of specific knowledge as vital for supporting such organizational
capabilities which entail improvisation with tools, rules, and routines, and coordination
amongst individuals, teams, and organizations.
In the following section we review the literature on knowledge integration,
specificity of knowledge, types of specific knowledge, and propose how the theory of
knowledge integration can be applied to emergency management.
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2.5 Knowledge integration: The subtle link between task complexity & performance
This research study proposes that improved performance in emergency response
organizations can be achieved not merely by a technological solution (e.g. sophisticated
databases and access mechanisms) or a personnel-related solution (e.g. hire smarter and
more experienced people), but rather by a structural approach to address performance
issues (Myers, 1996). For example an engineer will have studied the fundamentals of
physics when designing a bridge and a doctor is trained to study the basic structures of
the human body. Similarly emergency management professionals need to understand the
underlying concepts and phenomenon and how they interrelate to identify specific issues
and solutions. In particular, they need to understand the fundamental processes involved
in their operations and the dynamics of the organizations that they are part of.
We also draw from project management literature which views project related
issues from a knowledge management perspective. We see similarities between multiproject organizations and the environments in which emergency management personnel
need to work in. For example, projects are unique and each project might be significantly
different from the other in terms of being relatively self-contained and of a finite nature
of the project tasks (Bresnen et al., 2003). In the emergency management environment,
each disaster incident is unique (i.e. in the course of a year, one may encounter the threat
of a hurricane, a wild fire, or a medical emergency of a contagious disease) and calls for
the appropriate kind of response with the required resources and personnel with necessary
expertise and experience. As outlined below, project management scholars have
proposed strategies to manage the flow of knowledge and establish processes to enhance
organizational learning.
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Acknowledging that knowledge management efforts in project organizations may
not be mature, researchers are recommending that in order to avoid knowledge
fragmentation and loss of organizational learning, project organizations require
systematic and effective knowledge management (Kasvi et al., 2003). For example, they
propose the concepts of Project Organization Memory (knowledge stored from an
organization's past projects), and Project Organization Memory System (means by which
Project Organization Memory is realized). For multidisciplinary project teams, Fong
(2003) has researched the underlying processes and their interrelationships in knowledge
creation and provides a conceptual model of knowledge creation viewing collective
project learning as the nucleus of all three knowledge processes (i.e. sharing, generation,
and integration). In their research on knowledge management in project-based settings,
Bresnen et al. (2003) emphasize the importance of the social aspects of knowledge
retention and transfer. The authors examine the significance of social factors in
enhancing knowledge management capabilities in such environments proposing a
community-based approach to managing knowledge. Scholars have attempted to address
the question of what kind of social engagements are relevant in project work for
acquisition and sharing of tacit knowledge (Koskinen et al., 2003) using the Holistic
Concept of Man2 as the analytical tool.
We note that although some project management work has touched upon the
notion of knowledge integration, it needs further development which we intend to expand
upon in this review. In complex development projects, expertise needs to be drawn from

2

This is a concept which consists of an individual's three basic modes of existence: consciousness,
situationality, and corporeality. Consciousness is existence as a psychical-mental phenomenon, as
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diverse sources, so it is required to find a balance between differentiation and integration
(Garrety et al., 2004). The authors view differentiation as teams working separately and
integration as teams meeting and exchanging knowledge3. They apply a communities of
practice perspective to propose how to enable project managers to achieve a balance
between differentiation and integration in complex development projects. Huang and
Newell (2003) examine in their research within large organizations, the dynamics of
knowledge integration in the context of cross-functional project implementation. Their
findings suggest that in these cases knowledge integration is a process of engaging
organizational members, creating awareness of the value of the project for all
stakeholders, the management of social networks, and developing the social capital for all
members.
Among strategies of knowledge management, our focus is knowledge integration
which is needed to satisfy the conflicting demands for specialization and collaboration in
organizations (Grant, 1996). Understanding how to promote the integration of specific
knowledge can become a critical emergency management success factor and as
mentioned earlier it can be the key element for enabling the organization to become
adaptive in uncertain environments.
In this study we adopt the following definition: Integration of a particular area of
knowledge represents the extent to which that knowledge is shared and applied across
the organization and enables its members to better perform their tasks (Sabherwal &
Becerra-Fernandez, 2005). The need for integration arises because of the increased

experiencing (the mind), situationality is existence in relation to a certain part of reality i.e. the world or the
environment (the situation), corporeality is existence as an organism with organic processes (the body).

33

specialization of the knowledge which can be one of its inherent characteristics. Grant
(1996) explains that "firms need to reconcile specialization in the production domain
while remaining integrated in the knowledge domain" (pp. 609). We review the concept
of specific knowledge particularly as it applies to managing emergency response
organizations.
To conceptualize the specialization of knowledge, Jensen and Meckling (1996)
consider it as the knowledge that is possessed by a very limited number of persons and is
expensive to transfer. Other theorists have proposed component knowledge (knowledge
that already exists in one industrial complex but not known in firms from other
industries) and architectural knowledge (combining or integrating different types of
component knowledge into a new configuration) (Boer et al. 1999).
Prior literature has identified three types of specific knowledge: context-specific,
technology-specific, and context-and-technology specific (Sabherwal & BecerraFernandez, 2005). Context-specific knowledge refers to the knowledge of particular
circumstances of time and place in which work is performed (Hayek, 1945). On the other
hand, technology-specific knowledge is knowledge of the particular scientific or
theoretical discipline, which comprises of rules of cause and effect and the tools and
techniques used to address problems in that area (Choudhury & Sampler, 1997).
Advances in this theory have discerned a type of specific knowledge called context-and
technology-specific knowledge which is high in both context and technical specificity
(Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez, 2005).

3

Our conceptualization of knowledge integration goes beyond teams meeting and exchanging knowledge
as will be explained later in the section.
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In this review we consider all three types of specific knowledge since prior
research suggests that knowledge integration is a process of engaging organizational
members and the management of social networks (Huang & Newell, 2003). The aspect
of engaging organizational members is particularly relevant in emergency response
operations comprising of several organizations and government agencies. The following
table summarizes the various literature references about knowledge integration and types
of specific knowledge.
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Concept/
construct

Literature references

1

Scientific or
technology
specific
knowledge

1) Choudhury & Sampler, 1997
Specific knowledge has 2 attributes: (1) it is possessed by a very
limited number of individuals and (2) it is expensive to transfer
For example, the professional medical knowledge possessed by a
doctor is specific knowledge gained by relatively few individuals in
the medical profession
2) Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez, 2005
Specific knowledge is knowledge of the particular scientific or
theoretical discipline. It comprises of rules of cause and effect and
the tools and techniques used to address problems in that area.
3)Grimaldi & Torrisi, 2001
(In software industry) This is the specific knowledge concerning
new technologies, platforms and standards
4) Grant 1996; Huang & Newell, 2003
Efficiency of knowledge integration

2

Context
specific
knowledge

1) Choudhury & Sampler, 1997
This is specific knowledge that is gained in a given context. For
instance, the detailed knowledge that a doctor possesses about the
idiosyncrasies of a particular patient, that he/she has treated for a
number of years
2) Hayek 1945
This is Idiosyncratic knowledge, knowledge of context, or
knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place
3) Carlile 2004
Specialization in different problem-solving domains found in Weber
(1924/1947) between actors. This creates differences in levels of
experience, terminologies, tools, and incentives that are unique to
each specialized domain.
4) Grimaldi & Torrisi, 2001
(In software industry) linked to particular markets, users and
applications
5) Grant 1996; Huang & Newell, 2003
Scope of knowledge integration

3

Context and
technology
specific
knowledge

1) Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez, 2005
Knowledge that is high in both contextual and technical knowledge
specificity as explained above
2) Grant 1996; Huang & Newell, 2003
Flexibility of knowledge integration

Table 2: Summary of knowledge integration literature review
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3. Research model and hypotheses

3.1 Research perspective and focus
Based on the analysis and the review of related theories and empirical research
(Chapter 2), the research perspective and focus are presented in this section. We
acknowledge that other concepts and their relationships might be relevant for this topic of
research and will be mentioned as possible avenues for consideration in future research
undertakings.
As discussed earlier, work in the highly complex environment of emergency
management is particularly challenging and is the focus of this study. We reviewed the
literature in relevant areas such as emergency management, complex systems, task
complexity, knowledge management, knowledge integration, and task performance.
Based on the literature review and our observations at the Miami-Dade EOC, we further
develop the conceptualization of task complexity in the context of emergency operations
as described in the following section. We argue that considering "task" as the unit of
analysis, the study of the underlying task attributes in terms of complexity is a useful
approach to frame this study. Essentially these are the attributes which make the
execution of these tasks difficult and despite these challenges emergency management
personnel have to ensure the success of the tasks.
We examined knowledge-based perspectives which might be useful in this study
in improving task performance in general and more particularly in mitigating the impact
of task complexity on performance. We expect that the study of knowledge integration is
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appropriate in emergency response organizations for task management and for improving
task performance. We consider the three fundamental concepts in this work as task
complexity, integration of specific knowledge, and task performance and the
relationships between these concepts will be explored. In the following table we
summarize the knowledge integration related constructs and our interpretations in this
study.

1

Concept/ construct

Interpretations in this study

Scientific or technology
specific knowledge

For emergency response organizations, this represents the
kind of specific knowledge required to perform a task that
needs scientific or engineering expertise and experience in
special tools and techniques.
The engineering and technical knowledge of the power grid
system in FPL for supply and distribution of electricity is an
example of this type of specific knowledge.

2

Context specific
knowledge

For emergency response organizations, this represents the
kind of specific knowledge required to perform a task that is
unique to the context and depends on the time and
location.
For example one of the tasks related to hurricane
preparation is the evacuation of citizens in risk-prone
areas. The context-specific knowledge required in this task
is the experience of the use of the County transit system
prior to a hurricane, which roads to shut down, what are
traffic conditions, which are the critical expressways, etc.

3

Context and
technology specific
knowledge

For emergency response organizations, this represents the
kind of specific knowledge required to perform a task that is
both technology and context specific.
Immediately after a hurricane, the engineering expertise to
restore the power in a particular community with the
understanding that some critical facilities need to be
prioritized is an example of this type of specific knowledge.

Table 3: Knowledge integration constructs interpretations
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3.2 "Unbundling" task complexity
In this study three dimensions of task complexity have been identified as being
relevant for tasks typically undertaken in emergency environments: component
complexity (represents number and variety of resources and activities required to
complete the task), interactive complexity (degree of interactions and interdependencies),
and procedural rigidity (also called as extent of tight coupling -- rigidity of activities in
terms of timing or sequence).
Prior literature on complex systems and organizations has identified these factors
which increase complexity: number of variables in the system (Perrow, 1984), number of
information sources and business elements to be coordinated (Haeckel & Nolan, 1993),
size, number of elements, and their variety (Shenhar & Dvir, 1996). By observing the
tasks in emergency operations, we propose the concept Component complexity to
represent the task characteristics of number of people assigned, organizations being
represented, computer systems being accessed and used, machines required, and variety
of resources required to complete the task.
We observed that for a given activation at the Miami-Dade EOC, there are
approximately 130 people directly involved in the efforts related to responding to a
disaster incident in one operation shift. These individuals represent their organizations,
government agencies, and the regional EOC's and are high enough in their respective
organizational hierarchy to take decisions in crisis situations. Often times the EOC
operates in two 12-hour shifts and there can be 250 to 300 people involved in the EOC
activation. The sheer numbers of personnel, organizations, and the resources they depend
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on (e.g. computer systems, machine elements) can be staggering particularly when they
need to assemble and work together within hours' notice of the call for activation.
The second dimension we consider is task Interactive complexity. Researchers
have viewed this concept fairly consistently with slight variations depending on the
context of the problem. According to Perrow (1984), interactive complexity is the
number of ways in which the components of the system can interact. It depends on the
number of relationships between the variables and the number of feedback loops through
which the variables interact. Interactive complexity will increase with the presence of
unplanned, unfamiliar and unexpected sequences of events which are either not visible or
immediately comprehensible. Haeckel & Nolan (1993) contend that complexity of the
company will depend upon the number and type of relationships that exist between the
different elements, and Shenhar & Dvir (1996) point to the inter-connectedness of the
elements. As explained earlier, in his conceptualization of task complexity, Wood (1996)
has defined three types of task complexity: component, coordinative, and dynamic.
Campbell (1998) proposes four fundamental task attributes that make a task complex:
multiple paths, multiple outcomes, conflicting interdependence and uncertain linkages.
We draw support for the dimension of interactive complexity based on the high
degree of inter-relationships and inter-dependencies that we observed between the three
functional branches at the Miami-Dade EOC and the related organizations and agencies
that they coordinate. The three branches are Public Safety, Human Services, and the
Infrastructure functional group. Although the physical layout of the groups is spatially
separate during the activation, their mode of operations is anything but. A high degree of
coordination, communication and feedback is achieved by the following mechanisms:
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ceiling-mounted display monitors that are periodically updated by each branch
coordinator showing current status, E-Team computer software system, conventional
email, IAP reports, telephone, break-out planning sessions, and periodic status update
broadcasts. Perhaps the most telling episode of the degree of inter-connectedness in these
operations was demonstrated when one of the branch managers answered a phone call,
briskly walked over to the station of an individual in another branch and directly made
an urgent resource request. He explained later that based on the nature of the critical
urgency, there simply was no time to follow the procedures and communication protocol
that would normally be adhered to for similar resource requests.
The term Procedural rigidity is also referred to as tight coupling in other studies
(Sanchez & Mahoney 1996, Orton and Weick 1990, Perrow 1984). A tightly coupled
system is one that is highly interdependent: each part of the system is tightly linked to
many other parts and therefore a change in one part can rapidly affect the status of other
parts. Tightly coupled systems respond quickly to perturbations, but this response may be
disastrous. Loosely coupled or decoupled systems have fewer or less tight links between
parts and therefore are able to absorb failures or unplanned behavior without
destabilization. From an organizational perspective, tightly coupled systems are
portrayed as having responsive components that do not act independently, whereas
loosely coupled systems4 are portrayed as having independent components that do not act
responsively (Orton & Weick, 1990). Two important organizational outcomes of loose

4

The authors explain buffering in loosely coupled systems will prevent the spread of problems. For
example in software design, modularity reduces the occurrence of ripple effects caused by bugs in one
module spreading to other modules. Whereas this is how the impact of change is neutralized, adaptability
on the other hand, will allow the system to assimilate and accommodate the change.
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coupling in emergency management are buffering and adaptability. Sanchez and
Mahoney (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) use the principles of nearly decomposable
systems to facilitate loose coupling of organizational structures, which increase the
adaptive coordination. The chances of failure will increase with higher degrees of
procedural rigidity which might make the processes less adaptive.
The dimension of procedural rigidity needs special consideration in the
emergency management environment. Some tasks must adhere to extremely strict time
constraints failing which can lead to fatal consequences. For example evacuation orders
are given for a particular community based on possible risk related to flooding during a
hurricane. Once the order is issued the evacuation needs to be conducted in an orderly
fashion so that all the residents can reach the designated shelters safely. A delay in this
activity can expose the evacuees to dangerous circumstances since the rain, wind and in
general the weather conditions will continue to deteriorate. In addition there can be
important economic and political consequences related to such tasks as explained to us by
one of the emergency managers. The raising of expressway tolls is a critical decision to
ease the flow of traffic for evacuation procedures. However, if executed hastily or
prematurely, it can quickly result in potential loss of revenue sometimes to the tune of
millions of dollars.
We observe that these dimensions might have conflicting demands: for example,
to reduce procedural rigidity (or tight coupling) and increase redundancy, we may need to
add more parts and interconnect them; but this might increase the component complexity
since we are increasing the number of personnel and resources associated with them. At
the same time this might also increase the interactive complexity since the number of
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ways in which these parts might interact and provide feedback to each other is increased.
Conversely to reduce the component and interactive complexity, we may choose to
reduce the number of personnel and resources, but this may result in fewer redundancies
and backup personnel which might increase the procedural rigidity.
In summary, for emergency response organizations, a task with a high degree of
complexity is one which possesses one or more of the following characteristics:
component complexity (has many parts such as personnel, machines, computer systems);
interactive complexity (components can interact in many different ways); procedural
rigidity (processes are rigid or tightly coupled). We illustrate below how these
dimensions are particularly applicable for the study and analysis of emergency tasks.
As an example, consider a typical emergency task undertaken during preparations
for a hurricane: evacuating people with special medical needs before a hurricane. This
operation involves many personnel from varied organizational units in the EOC
(transport, medical facilities, electric utility, etc.) and the technology systems they rely
on. Before the operation begins, the people who require the evacuation need to be
identified and put on the "call down" list so they can be informed ahead of time about the
evacuation plans. The receiving facilities have to be prepared with the necessary
equipment and medical professionals and backup provisions in case of loss of power.
Transport vehicles have to arranged, some of which might need specialized equipment,
along with available drivers who need to be knowledgeable of the evacuation routes.
These personnel and the organizations they represent need to interact with each other in
unfamiliar circumstances with a high degree of uncertainty since many of the activities
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might vary with the changing weather conditions. Hence, such a task conceptually is
representative of a high degree of component complexity and interactive complexity.
We also note that in this task, the different units are very tightly dependent on
each other. In addition the task has to be completed successfully within strict time
deadlines; otherwise it might result in severe damage to life and/or property. Any change
in a particular event (such as the flooding of a roadway or an evacuation route made
inaccessible due to debris) will immediately impact several other activities forcing the
responsible personnel to adapt quickly, make alterations to the plan, and continue
working the task. Hence this task is conceptually representative of a high degree of
procedural rigidity.
In the following table we summarize the task complexity constructs and the
interpretations of these constructs in this study:
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Concept/
construct

Interpretations in this study

Task component
complexity

For emergency response organizations, a task with a high degree of
component complexity is one which has many parts: personnel,
teams, organizations, computer systems, machines, and any other
resources required to accomplish the task.

Task interactive
complexity

For emergency response organizations, a task with a high degree of
interactive complexity is one which the personnel and activities can
interact in many different ways.
For example a task for evacuating people with special medical
needs before a hurricane involves many organizational units in the
EOC (transport, medical facilities, electric utility etc.) and the
technology systems they rely on. In addition they need to interact
with each other in unfamiliar circumstances and a high degree of
uncertainty.

Procedural rigidity
OR
Coupling (tight or
loose)

For emergency response organizations, the coupling will depend on
whether the processes are closely dependent on each other in terms
of time and sequence. A task in which the activities have to be
executed in a rigid sequence and adhere to strict timelines will have
a high degree of procedural rigidity.
For example, a task for evacuating people with special medical
needs before a hurricane involves many organizational units in the
EOC (transport, medical facilities, electric utility etc.) and the
technology systems they rely on. In this task, the different units are
very tightly dependent on each other. In addition the task has to be
completed within strict time deadlines; otherwise it might result in
severe damage to life and/or property.

Table 4: Task complexity constructs interpretations
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3.3 Task performance
As discussed in the literature review section (Section 2.3) we propose two
dimensions to evaluate the performance of emergency management tasks: task
effectiveness and task efficiency. These relate generally to the main criteria that are
important success factors in emergency organization centers that we observed and how
they have been communicated in support documents that we describe below.
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)5 documents are published and distributed
on a yearly basis by the Miami-Dade EOC. The documents are categorized based on the
area of responsibility such as Public Works and Engineering (ESF #3), Energy (ESF
#12), Communication (ESF #2), and so on. These documents contain the definition of
the area of responsibility, objectives of the operations, processes, roles and
responsibilities, procedures, direction and control, planning and information, response,
and proposed checklists. Particularly they outline the tasks that they are responsible for,
the planned response activities, and an overall plan for accomplishing the tasks.
At a general level, the successful completion of these tasks would be a fair
assessment of task performance. However, depending on the nature of the disaster event
and how it develops, the teams need to change and adapt their responses to be effective in
volatile circumstances. For example some of the objectives for Public Works and
Engineering ESF #3 (p. 3) are: "The emergency repair of potable water utilities, sanitary

5

"The SOP is intended to provide an instructional manual for those involved in the preparedness, response,
and recovery phase of an incident or disaster. (It is) a basic foundation from which sound decisions can be
made. The SOP is a living document, requiring constant review and update. Revisions to the base
document will be made as necessary. However, a formal, for distribution, comprehensive revision will be
made on an annual basis to be included… no later than October 30 th each year". Public Works and
Engineering ESF #3
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sewer, storm water collection facilities, generators and electrical distribution systems;
perform the initial damage assessment survey and prioritize preliminary repair to the
infrastructure; perform a preliminary vulnerability survey and assessment of damage to
hazardous waste storage, generation, distribution, and disposal sites". Further, the
guidelines provided are (Public Works and Engineering ESF #3, p. 3): "Prioritization of
ESF-3 resource requests will be based upon the primary objective of protecting the life,
health, and welfare of the community. During the emergency response period it may be
necessary for ESF-3 to rely on local resources and agencies to act individually, based
upon their individual disaster action plans".
This goes to show that a certain amount of flexibility is built into the objectives
and proposed guidelines for the plans and procedures of the emergency tasks. Hence in
the emergency environment, in addition to purely objective measures, it is important to
incorporate perceptual elements of satisfaction of all participants and how the incident
requirements were met for a given task. As mentioned in the literature review (Section
2.3), we also draw from success criteria in project management (Freeman & Beale 1992)
and how the evaluation will also depend upon the "rater" of the task based on different
viewpoints (Belout 1998). Based on these analyses and observations, we describe below
the two dimensions we propose to assess emergency task performance.
Task effectiveness refers to the extent to which the emergency incident
requirements were met. It represents the extent to which the task outcome was
satisfactory to all the participants and stakeholders. Equally important is how well the
task was executed without disrupting other tasks and how well the team managed and
resolved any possible conflicts. For example, consider a task for delivering a backup
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generator to a medical facility within one hour for emergency medical care. The
effectiveness will depend on: whether the right equipment was delivered to the right
facility and whether the equipment had the correct specifications as requested. In the
event that if the task depends on special personnel and equipment (such as
transportation), the effectiveness will be evaluated based on how well the team managed
the task in terms of potential conflicts and usage of scarce resources.
Task efficiency refers to the extent to which the task was completed in the
required time frame and within the allocated budget, personnel, and resources. For
example, consider once again the task for delivering a backup generator to a medical
facility within one hour for emergency medical care. The efficiency will depend on
whether the task was completed on time using the available personnel and resources.
Perhaps in such a situation the timing consideration would be critical and in adverse
conditions, the team would make a paramount effort to comply with this request within
the allotted time requirements, even if it meant tapping into personnel and/or resources
which were not originally included in the plan for this task.
In the following table we summarize the task performance constructs and the
interpretations of these constructs in this study:
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Concept/
construct
Task efficiency

Interpretations in this study
Refers to the extent to which the task was completed in the required
time frame and within the allocated budget and resources.
For example, a task for delivering a backup generator to a medical
facility within one hour for emergency medical care. The efficiency will
depend on whether the task was completed on time using the available
resources.

Task
effectiveness

Refers to the extent to which the emergency incident requirements
were met. It represents the extent to which the task outcome was
satisfactory to the participants.
For example, a task for delivering a backup generator to a medical
facility within one hour for emergency medical care. The effectiveness
will depend on: whether the equipment was delivered to the right
facility, whether the equipment had the correct specifications as
requested, and how well the task was executed without disrupting
other tasks.

Table 5: Task performance constructs interpretations
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The following table summarizes the main concepts in this study and the
definitions of the terms as conceptualized based on the literature review and our
observations:

Concept

Definition

Context specific
knowledge

Type of specific knowledge that is characterized as idiosyncratic
knowledge,
knowledge of context, localized knowledge, or knowledge of particular
circumstances of time and place

Technology
specific
knowledge

Type of specific knowledge characterized as of the particular scientific
or theoretical discipline. It comprises of rules of cause and effect and
the tools and techniques used to address problems in that area.

Context and
technology
specific
knowledge

Type of specific knowledge that is characterized by both contextual
and technological specificity

Task component
complexity

Represents number and variety of resources and activities required to
complete the task

Task interactive
complexity

Represents the number of ways in which components of the task can
interact, have inter-dependencies, and feedback loops. It also
represents uncertain links between the paths and the outcome.

Task procedural
rigidity

Represents rigidity of processes with respect to time and sequence
and the degree of impact of change. It also represents lack of
redundancies, backups, and process flexibility.

Task
effectiveness

Extent to which the task requirements were met, the participants were
satisfied, and other tasks were not impacted

Task efficiency

Extent to which task was completed in the required time, within the
allocated budget and resources

Table 6: Concepts and definitions
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3.4 Research model
In the prior sections we discussed the research problems and reviewed the
literature related to the topics of interest on past theoretical and empirical findings. Using
the conceptual development as a basis for this study, we present a research model and a
preliminary set of hypotheses to formulate the relationships between the concepts that
were introduced and explained. The hypotheses at this point, also represent our
observations of the workings of the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center. They
build upon prior research in domains that we touched upon in the literature review
sections, and extend them to task complexity and knowledge integration strategies in the
emergency organization. Further pruning of the space of the hypotheses may be required
as the study progresses.
One of the focal constructs to analyze work in emergency organizations is task
complexity which consists of three dimensions: component complexity, interactive
complexity, and procedural rigidity. Task performance or outcome is comprised of two
dimensions: effectiveness and efficiency. Hypotheses (1a) through (1c) are concerned
about the relationships between the dimensions of task complexity and task effectiveness.
Hypotheses (2a) through (2c) explain the relationships between task complexity and task
efficiency. We propose that strategies of integration of the three types of specific
knowledge will improve emergency task performance. The construct for integration of
specific knowledge has three dimensions: one each for integration of context-specific,
technology-specific, and context-and-technology specific knowledge. Hypotheses (3a)
through (3c) describe the relationships between knowledge integration and task
effectiveness and hypotheses (4a) through (4c) describe the relationships between
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knowledge integration and task efficiency. At this stage of the research we intend to
explore the possible relationship between dimensions of task complexity and integration
of three types of specific knowledge.

Integration of
specific knowledge

EM task
complexity

EM task
performance

•Component
•Interactive
•Procedural rigidity

•Task effectiveness
•Task efficiency

Type of
specific knowledge

EM: Emergency Management

•Context-specific
•Technology-specific
•Context-andtechnology-specific

10

Figure 1: Research model
3.5 Research hypotheses
We have argued that emergency tasks with inherent attributes which increase the
complexity will be more difficult to control and manage. Higher degrees of component
complexity imply there are greater numbers of personnel, organizations, computer
systems and other resources involved. An increased level of interactive complexity
would imply a greater need for interactions amongst the activities, some of which might
be unforeseen and unpredictable. In addition if the task also has higher procedural
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rigidity, the emergency team would be under increased pressure to deliver and mistakes
and failures are more likely to occur. If these factors are not properly managed, they will
reduce the extent to which the task requirements are met and overall the participants will
not be completely satisfied with the task outcome. Hence we propose:
H1a) Component complexity of tasks is negatively associated with task effectiveness
H1b) Interactive complexity of tasks is negatively associated with task effectiveness
H1c) Procedural rigidity of tasks is negatively associated with task effectiveness
Most tasks in emergency situations need to be completed successfully within
stipulated time constraints and sometimes using the available resources. Resources
which include equipment, personnel, and machines cannot be easily and quickly
transported without adequate planning and preparation. Complex tasks with higher
degrees of component, interactive and/ or procedural rigidity will impose greater
demands on the emergency team and will reduce the extent to which the task might be
successfully completed within the requirements of time and budget. Hence we propose:
H2a) Component complexity of tasks is negatively associated with task efficiency
H2b) Interactive complexity of tasks is negatively associated with task efficiency
H2c) Procedural rigidity of tasks is negatively associated with task efficiency
An important ingredient of the response activities during or after an emergency
event involves dynamic decision-making (Samii, Van Hassenhove, Kumar, & BecerraFernandez, 2002b). Situations in complex task environments are beyond the capacity of
any one individual's prior experience and problem solving abilities (Comfort, Dunn,
Johnson, Skertich, & Zagorecki, 2004). Integration of specific knowledge becomes
crucial for quickly and adequately sharing knowledge and completing the task
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successfully. This serves as the basis for creating organizational flexibility required for
reliable performance in such circumstances (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). Hence we
propose:
H3a) Integration of context-specific knowledge is positively associated with task
effectiveness
H3b) Integration of technology-specific knowledge is positively associated with task
effectiveness
H3c) Integration of context-and-technology-specific knowledge is positively associated
with task effectiveness
Coordination between diverse personnel and organizations is difficult to achieve
in emergency environments (Comfort et al., 2004). Members need to know which
individual or organization possesses the skill or expertise that is required for the task on
hand and strategies that support the exchange of critical information need to be
implemented. A strategy that enhances the integration of a type of specific knowledge
will improve coordination thereby making the emergency organization more responsive
and adaptive (Coakes, Willis, & Clarke, 2002) Hence we propose:
H4a) Integration of context-specific knowledge is positively associated with task
efficiency
H4b) Integration of technology-specific knowledge is positively associated with task
efficiency
H4c) Integration of context-and-technology-specific knowledge is positively associated
with task efficiency
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The above hypotheses represent our expectations about the impact of task
complexity on the task outcome and also how the integration of specific knowledge
might influence the task outcome. At this stage of the research we intend to explore the
possible relationship between dimensions of task complexity and integration of three
types of specific knowledge.

3.5.1 Research hypotheses for moderating effects
We adopt the working definition of moderation as explained by Baron and Kenny
(1986): A moderator is a "variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the relation
between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable"
(p.1174). This implies that a variable can be considered to be a moderator if the
relationship between the independent and dependent variable depends on the level of the
moderator variable (Saks, 1995). In this study we expect that the relationship between
task complexity and emergency task performance depends on the level of each type of
specific knowledge we have considered, namely context-specific, technology-specific,
and context-and-technology-specific.
To conceptualize the understanding of the term "level of specific knowledge", we
draw from prior research which theorizes general knowledge as being low in specificity
(Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez, 2005). Thus if the area of knowledge required to
complete an emergency task was not context-specific or technology-specific, it would be
categorized as general knowledge. Our expectation is that the nature of the relationships
between task complexity, knowledge integration, and task performance will be different
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depending on the extent to which the area of knowledge is general (low-specificity) or
context-specific or technology-specific.
Hence we propose the following models and the related hypotheses for the
moderating effects of each type of specific knowledge:

Context-specific
Knowledge

Task
Complexity

Knowledge
Integration

Figure 2: Moderation of context-specific knowledge on knowledge integration

H5a) The level of context-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task component complexity and knowledge integration
H5b) The level of context-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task interactive complexity and knowledge integration
H5c) The level of context-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task procedural rigidity and knowledge integration
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Context-specific
Knowledge

Task
Complexity

Task
Performance:
Efficiency

Knowledge
Integration

Figure 3: Moderation of context-specific knowledge on task efficiency

In Figure 3, we present the moderating effects of context-specific knowledge.
First, we examine the moderating effects of context-specific knowledge with task
complexity dimensions (component, interactive, and procedural rigidity) along with
knowledge integration as independent variables. Task efficiency is the dependent
variable. Thus, we propose the following:
H6a) The level of context-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task component complexity, knowledge integration, and task efficiency
H6b) The level of context-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task interactive complexity, knowledge integration, and task efficiency
H6c) The level of context-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task procedural rigidity, knowledge integration, and task efficiency
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Context-specific
Knowledge

Task
Complexity

Task
Performance:
Effectiveness

Knowledge
Integration

Figure 4: Moderation of context-specific knowledge on task effectiveness

In Figure 4, we present the moderating effects of context-specific knowledge. We
examine the moderating effects of context-specific knowledge with task complexity
dimensions (component, interactive, and procedural rigidity) along with knowledge
integration as the independent variables. Task effectiveness is the dependent variable.
Thus, we propose the following:
H7a) The level of context-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task component complexity, knowledge integration, and task effectiveness
H7b) The level of context-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task interactive complexity, knowledge integration, and task effectiveness
H7c) The level of context-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task procedural rigidity, knowledge integration, and task effectiveness
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Technologyspecific
Knowledge

Task
Complexity

Knowledge
Integration

Figure 5: Moderation of technology-specific knowledge on knowledge integration

In Figure 5, we present the moderating effects of technology-specific knowledge.
We examine the moderating effects of technology-specific knowledge with task
complexity dimensions (component, interactive, and procedural rigidity) as the
independent variables. Knowledge integration is the dependent variable. Thus, we
propose the following:
H8a) The level of technology-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task component complexity and knowledge integration
H8b) The level of technology-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task interactive complexity and knowledge integration
H8c) The level of technology-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task procedural rigidity and knowledge integration

59

Technologyspecific
Knowledge

Task
Complexity

Task
Performance:
Efficiency

Knowledge
Integration

Figure 6: Moderation of technology-specific knowledge on task efficiency

In Figure 6, we present the moderating effects of technology-specific knowledge.
We examine the moderating effects of technology-specific knowledge with task
complexity dimensions (component, interactive, and procedural rigidity) along with
knowledge integration as the independent variables. Task efficiency is the dependent
variable. Thus, we propose the following:
H9a) The level of technology-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task component complexity, knowledge integration, and task efficiency
H9b) The level of technology-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task interactive complexity, knowledge integration, and task efficiency
H9c) The level of technology-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task procedural rigidity, knowledge integration, and task efficiency
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Technologyspecific
Knowledge

Task
Complexity

Task
Performance:
Effectiveness

Knowledge
Integration

Figure 7: Moderation of technology-specific knowledge on task effectiveness

In Figure 7, we present the moderating effects of technology-specific knowledge.
We examine the moderating effects of technology-specific knowledge with task
complexity dimensions (component, interactive, and procedural rigidity) along with
knowledge integration as the independent variables. Task effectiveness is the dependent
variable. Thus, we propose the following:
H10a) The level of technology-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship
between task component complexity, knowledge integration, and task effectiveness
H10b) The level of technology-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship
between task interactive complexity, knowledge integration, and task effectiveness
H10c) The level of technology-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship
between task procedural rigidity, knowledge integration, and task effectiveness
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(In the following figures and descriptions, the term "Context-and-technology-specific
knowledge" has been abbreviated to "C-and-T-specific knowledge").

C-and-T-specific
Knowledge

Task
Complexity

Knowledge
Integration

Figure 8: Moderation of context-and-technology-specific knowledge on knowledge
integration

In Figure 8, we present the moderating effects of C-and-T-specific knowledge.
We examine the moderating effects of C-and-T-specific knowledge with task complexity
dimensions (component, interactive, and procedural rigidity) as the independent
variables. Knowledge integration is the dependent variable. Thus, we propose the
following:
H11a) The level of C-and-T-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task component complexity and knowledge integration
H11b) The level of C-and-T-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task interactive complexity and knowledge integration
H11c) The level of C-and-T-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task procedural rigidity and knowledge integration
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Figure 9: Moderation of context-and-technology-specific knowledge on efficiency
In Figure 9, we present the moderating effects of C-and-T-specific knowledge.
We examine the moderating effects of C-and-T-specific knowledge with task complexity
dimensions (component, interactive, and procedural rigidity) along with knowledge
integration as the independent variables. Task efficiency is the dependent variable.
Thus, we propose the following:
H12a) The level of C-and-T-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task component complexity, knowledge integration, and task efficiency
H12b) The level of C-and-T-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task interactive complexity, knowledge integration, and task efficiency
H12c) The level of C-and-T-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task procedural rigidity, knowledge integration, and task efficiency
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Figure 10: Moderation of context-and-technology-specific knowledge on task
effectiveness

H13a) The level of C-and-T-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task component complexity, knowledge integration, and task effectiveness
H130b) The level of C-and-T-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task interactive complexity, knowledge integration, and task effectiveness
H13c) The level of C-and-T-specific knowledge will moderate the relationship between
task procedural rigidity, knowledge integration, and task effectiveness

3.5.2 Research hypotheses for mediating effects
Our initial proposition of mediation was derived by the notion that knowledge
integration may be an important process construct for understanding the true nature of the
relationship between task complexity and task performance. We adopt the working
definition of mediation as explained by Baron and Kenny (1986): "In general, a given
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variable may be said to function as a mediator to the extent that it accounts for the
relation between the predictor and the criterion" (p. 1176). The mediating variable
explains how or why the predictor (independent variable) affects the criterion (dependent
variable) (Saks, 1995). In this study, one set of hypotheses deal with the impact of task
complexity dimensions on the outcome, task performance variables. The mediating
hypotheses help us understand how this relationship occurs by treating knowledge
integration as the mediating or intervening variable.

Mediator
a

b

Independent
Variable

Dependent
Variable
c

Figure 11: Mediation causal chain model
(Adapted from Baron and Kenny, p. 1176)

The above path diagram is introduced to depict the causal chain model and for
clarifying the meaning of mediation in the research study (Baron & Kenny, 1986). This
represents the basic causal chain which includes the mediating variable. There are three
variables in the system: independent variable (the three dimensions of task complexity -component, interactive, and procedural rigidity), dependent variable (two dimensions of
task performance -- efficiency and effectiveness), and mediating variable (integration of
specific knowledge). There are two paths which feed into the outcome or dependent
variable: the direct impact of the independent variable (path c) and the impact of the

65

mediating variable (path b). In addition, there is also the path from the independent
variable to the mediator which we consider.
The overall hypothesis can be stated as: Integration of specific knowledge
mediates the relationship between task complexity and task performance. We propose
the following:
H14a) Integration of specific knowledge mediates the relationship between task
component complexity and efficiency.
H14b) Integration of specific knowledge mediates the relationship between task
interactive complexity and efficiency.
H14c) Integration of specific knowledge mediates the relationship between task
procedural rigidity and efficiency.
H15a) Integration of specific knowledge mediates the relationship between task
component complexity and effectiveness.
H15b) Integration of specific knowledge mediates the relationship between task
interactive complexity and effectiveness.
H15c) Integration of specific knowledge mediates the relationship between task
procedural rigidity and effectiveness.
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4. Research Methodology
4.1 Research method
The research method is planned to consist of five phases: (1) conceptual
development, (2) generation and refinement of measurement items, (3) data collection,
(4) data analysis and measurement validation, and (5) research model and hypothesis
testing (Xia & Lee, 2005). The research setting for this study is the Miami-Dade County
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) located in Miami in the state of Florida.
The basis of the overall research model of this study is of an exploratory nature
rather than confirmatory. Although many research studies exist in the discipline of
knowledge management in general, there is a lack of theories in the specific areas which
are of interest in this study. Hence the nature of this work is deemed exploratory since
we view this work as being at the early stage of theory development.
Prior to designing the survey questionnaire, we met with EOC staff on different
occasions over the past two years to gain understanding about the typical emergency
tasks, computer systems and technologies, and coordination mechanisms as they pertain
to this research. For example, we scheduled meetings and interviews with key
management staff and emergency coordinators. We also were invited to attend several
day-long simulation "drill"-- an exercise designed by the EOC for all participating
organizations and agencies to simulate events based on a prior hurricane and to practice
coordination and response activities required to accomplish the tasks. This was part of
the preparation and planning program before the onslaught of the hurricane season in
June 2007. As a team of researchers, we participated as observers at the EOC when it
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was activated for hurricane Ernesto (later downgraded to tropical storm) in late August
2006 for three days (prior, during, and after the event).
A qualitative review and analysis has been conducted based on these OEM/EOC
archives: Standard Operations Procedures (SOP), Local Response Protocols, Situation
Reports and Incident Action Plans (IAP) of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma which
occurred in 2005.
4.2 Research site
The research setting for this study was the Miami-Dade County Emergency
Operations Center (EOC). The state of Florida is currently considered one of the most
effective in disaster management. The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) has
identified eighteen types of hazards that pose an emergency threat to Florida. These are:
wildfires, thunderstorms, tornadoes, lightning, flood, terrorism, drought, heat waves,
hurricanes, cold, animals, nuclear, hazardous materials, cyber attacks, information
warfare, aircraft, and bombs. The division is organized into four bureaus: compliance
planning and support, policy and planning, preparedness and response, and recovery and
mitigation. Of these, the Bureau of Preparedness and Response is responsible for
developing and maintaining the State’s ability to effectively respond to a wide variety of
threats and has two sections, namely preparedness and response. The Response Section
coordinates emergency response at the state level, and provides the necessary technical
assistance to county governments. The Miami-Dade County Office of Emergency
Management (OEM) is the lead agency in an emergency event and the Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) is the site for all of the emergency management operations.
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The EOC is organized under the guidelines of Incident Command System (ICS)
with Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance and Administration (BecerraFernandez et al. 2007). Figure 12 depicts the floor plan organization for the operation of
the EOC. Furthermore, Operations depends on a large array of organizations that are
organized into three branches: the Public Safety Functional Group Branch, the Human
Services Functional Group Branch, and the Infrastructure Functional Group Branch:
1. Public Safety Group Branch. The Public Safety Functional Group Branch includes,
but is not limited to, the following organizations: National Park Service, Florida Fish
and Wildlife Conservation Commission, US Coast Guard, the Department of
Environmental Resources Management (DERM), Miami-Dade Fire Rescue Dept.,
Florida National Guard, Animal Services, Miami-Dade Corrections Dept., Florida
Dept. of Law Enforcement, Florida Highway Patrol, and Miami-Dade Police Dept.
The Public Safety Manager Branch Director coordinates the activities of the public
safety functional group, with the assistance of the Public Safety Assistant.
2. Human Services Group Branch. The Human Services Functional Group Branch
consists of, but is not limited to, the following organizations: Dept. of Human
Services, Team Metro, Salvation Army, Greater Miami Convention and Visitors
Bureau, American Red Cross, Miami-Dade County Public Schools, Miami-Dade
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD), Dept. of Mental Health,
Miami-Dade Housing Agency, Florida Dept. of Children and Families, Miami-Dade
County Health Dept., Florida Agency for Health Care Administrators (AHCA), and
the Miami-Dade Fire Rescue Emergency Management Services. The Human Services
Manager Branch Director coordinates the activities of the Human Services Functional
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Group Branch, with the assistance of the Human Services Assistant and the Special
Needs Coordinator.
3. Infrastructure Group Branch. The Infrastructure Functional Group Branch consists
of, but is not limited to, the Miami-Dade Solid Waste Dept, Miami-Dade Water and
Sewer, South Florida Water Management District, Miami-Dade Transit-Regular
Services, Miami-Dade Transit Evacuation, Miami-Dade Public Schools, Miami-Dade
Public Works, Florida Dept. of Transportation, Miami-Dade Parks Dept., Agriculture
Extension, City Gas Comcast, Miami-Dade Enterprise Technology Services Dept.
(ETSD), BellSouth, and Florida Power & Light, the airports, and the Port of Miami.
The Infrastructure Manager Branch Director coordinates the activities of the
Infrastructure Manager Branch with the assistance of the Infrastructure Assistant.
The Operations Section Manager coordinates the activities of the three functional
groups branches, with the assistance of the EOC Support Manager, the Operations
Section Assistant, and the Planning Situation Assessment Assistant.
A number of additional organizations are represented in the periphery of the
EOC: Florida Division of Emergency Management (DEM), neighboring county’s
emergency management liaisons (including Monroe County, Broward County, Florida
City, Martin County, and Collier County), and the Divisional EOCs (Miami Beach,
North Miami, North Miami Beach, Homestead, Coral Gables, Hialeah, and the city of
Miami). In addition, representatives from Homestead Air Force Reserve Base and
FEMA are also included. Many other agencies are called upon following a disaster
event.
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The EOC depends on a number of state-of-the-art tools that it uses to manage
emergencies: (1) Hurrevac, a software developed jointly by the National Hurricane
Center, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and FEMA to track tropical cyclones and
provide a continuous flow of information to emergency managers; (2) SLOSH II,
software developed jointly by the National Hurricane Center Storm Surge Group, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, USGS and FEMA with input from the state of Florida
and several local emergency managers including Miami-Dade County. It demonstrates
probable storm surge based on size, direction and forward speed of a storm; (3) SALT
(Storm Action Lead Time), software developed by Miami-Dade County OEM and ETSD
to provide a check-list of pre- and post-storm activities; (4) Snapshot, software
developed by Miami-Dade OEM to provide virtually instant information on damages
caused by a storm or flood event; and (5) E-Team, a collaborative software for crisis
management provided by NC4.
During such events, critical decisions must be made that involve crossorganizational and cross-agency coordination, and sharing of data, information and
knowledge (Becerra-Fernandez & Prietula 2006). As these events and their contexts are
infrequent and varied, the nature of the decisions, where they are made, who makes
them, the data and information resources required to make and monitor them, and the
location of available knowledge to drive them may sometimes be unknown, unavailable,
or both. At the Miami-Dade EOC decisions are thoroughly documented via after action
reports that cover a period of twelve hours before, during, and after the hurricane. But
even though the Miami-Dade EOC is disciplined about recording the necessary
documentation to prevent loosing their corporate memory, these after action reports may
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not cover every issue that needs to be dealt with during an emergency, as frequently
unique and unanticipated events arise during each emergency (Becerra-Fernandez et al.
2008). Furthermore, people may leave the organization, due to attrition or retirement,
and some of the informal rules that serve as the “glue” that affords the very ability to
function may be lost (Becerra-Fernandez et al. 2007).
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Figure 12: Emergency Operations Center activation floor plan
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4.3 Survey questionnaire design
The survey design consists of three main sections: section (1) asks for information
about the characteristics of the emergency management task that the respondent was
recently involved; section (2) is about the characteristics of a relevant knowledge area
that was used to accomplish the task; and section (3) asks for background information
about the respondent which will be useful for data segmentation and analysis.
In section (1), we ask the respondent to answer the questions about the task as
representatives of their respective organizations. We provide guidelines for the task
selection by listing some sample task descriptions related to response and recovery efforts
during an incident such as a hurricane, which were explained to us by the EOC Point-ofcontact. The list is certainly not meant to be exhaustive, and the respondent can specify a
task they worked on recently which is not on the list. Overall, we expect these tasks to
cover a wide range with variations in the degree of complexity (relatively low to
relatively high). In this section there are groups of items to assess the task characteristics:
degree of component complexity, interactive complexity, and procedural rigidity. In
addition there are measurement items to assess the degree of task effectiveness and
efficiency. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to questions such as "The different activities in
the task interacted with each other in unpredictable ways during the execution of the
task" as one of the measures of task interactive complexity. A high value of response for
such a question (5, 6, or 7) will indicate a relatively high degree of interactive complexity
for the task. They responded to questions such as "How many organizations were
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involved in the task" by filling in the appropriate number as one of the measures of task
component complexity. The larger the number of organizations involved in the task, it
would indicate a relatively high degree of task component complexity.
The research design and hence the questionnaire is developed around the pivotal
notion that the integration of a specific area of knowledge is critical for the successful
completion of the task. In the second section, we ask the respondent to identify one
specific area of knowledge that they would consider critical for executing the task that
they have identified in section (1). We intend to study three categories of specific
knowledge: Context-specific (knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place in
which work is performed), Technology-specific (knowledge of a particular scientific or
theoretical field, which includes the rules, tools and techniques that may be used to solve
problems in that area), and Context-and-Technology-specific knowledge (knowledge that
is both context-specific and technology-specific (Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez, 2005).
We have provided examples of each type of specific knowledge and attempted to list the
corresponding knowledge areas for the emergency tasks. The respondent can either
choose one from any of these examples or describe one of their own as relevant for the
task.
The questionnaire includes six items for assessing the integration of each type of
knowledge (Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez, 2005). There are four items each to assess
whether the type of specificity is context or technology related. In addition there are
items to assess the characteristics of the area of knowledge: degree of knowledge sharing,
codifiability, teachability, and common knowledge. Participants responded on a 7-point
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to questions
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such as "This knowledge makes use of tools and techniques specific to a particular
discipline" as one of the measures of technology-specific knowledge.
In the third section, we ask for background information about the respondent.
Primarily this is information about their title, work experience in their own organization
(if different from the EOC), and in the field of emergency management, and educational
background. They were assured that the information will be treated as confidential and
no personal information will be reported. In return for their collaboration, we committed
to provide each respondent an executive report of our findings at the end of the study.
4.4 Generation and refinement of measurement items
The initial items for the 3 dimensions of task complexity (component, interactive,
and rigidity) were generated through review of the literature and field observations.
These are new measures because we found no established measures for these constructs
in prior studies that were especially suitable for our intended use in the field of
emergency management. Measures for the constructs related to integration of specific
knowledge were adapted from well-established measures which were used in prior
knowledge management studies (Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez 2005). Most measures
for task performance in prior studies were found to be narrowly focused on the specific
task being performed in the context of the study. Hence the measures for task
effectiveness and task efficiency were adapted from well-established studies in prior
literature on project management which were found to be suitable for this work (Freeman
& Beale 1992; Belout 1998).
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Based on the conceptual development and the related review of current literature,
the initial pool of measurement items was first developed. As clarified above, whenever
possible we adapted the items from prior studies in related fields of the literature. We
confirmed the initial conceptual model and the measurement items through field
interviews, meetings, discussions, and observations, which were modified whenever
necessary.
4.5 Sorting procedure
The initial pool of measurement items for the 8 constructs were further refined
and modified through a sorting procedure and pilot tests (Xia & Lee, 2005). The purpose
of the sorting procedure is to qualitatively assess the face validity and the construct
validity of the initial measurement items (Moore & Bebasat, 1991). Four separate
sessions of the sorting procedure were conducted with four judges: one faculty member,
and three Ph.D. candidates in the College of Business in the University. Each one of the
judges was well advanced in their research and had several years of work experience in
their respective fields.
Each measurement item was printed and pasted on 3x5 inch card. The judge was
explained the research problem addressed in this study and a brief explanation of the
eight constructs being used in the research model. During the sorting process, each judge
was asked to carefully read the measurement item on each card and place it in one of the
eight constructs. An additional category "ambiguous/ unclear" was created for the judge
to use if they felt the item did not belong to any of the eight categories.
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The judge's categorization was compared with the standard groupings for each
construct as was originally intended for the measurement items. On an average each
judge grouped two items differently during the sorting process and they explained why
their perception of the measurement item was different. This indicated an agreement
level greater than a threshold of eighty percent for the complete set of measurement
items. After each session, we carefully reviewed the discrepancies and accordingly made
modifications to the measurement items in the questionnaire. These mostly included
minor revisions regarding usage of terms or emphasis on certain phrases in order to
improve clarity. The detailed instructions used for the sorting procedure, the forms used
for the sorting results and two sample result sheets have been included in the appendix.
4.6 Pilot test
Once the Q-sorting procedure was completed, the next step was to conduct a pilot
test of the instrument at the research site, the Miami-Dade County Emergency Operations
Center (EOC). The purpose of the pilot test was to further validate the relevance,
coverage, and clarity of the items, particularly in the context of emergency management.
The test was conducted with five managers and coordinators at the EOC, who represented
different areas of responsibility across the Center. First, the participants were given an
overview of the research project and then they were asked to provide their feedback as
they filled the questionnaire.
Several important suggestions were noted in the course of the discussions with the
participants. We particularly benefited from their ideas related to the emergency task
typology and the corresponding area of specific knowledge they used to work on the task.
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We revised the task typology to show a variety of sample tasks under two categories -low task complexity, and high task complexity. In the section describing the different
knowledge areas, we included examples for each of the three types of specific
knowledge: context, technology, and context-and-technology. We also noted their
estimates as to how long it might take a participant to complete the questionnaire, given
that we are aiming for an average of twenty minutes. Other than a few editorial changes,
no major revisions were deemed necessary to the measuring items themselves.
The following table describes the final list of constructs and measurement items
planned in this study:
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Table 7: Constructs and measurement items
Construct
Task attribute:
Component
complexity

Task attribute:
Interactive complexity

Task attribute:
Procedural rigidity

Integration of
Technology-specific
knowledge

Integration of
Context-specific
knowledge

Integration of
Context-andTechnology-specific
knowledge
Task efficiency

Task effectiveness

Measurement Items
How many people were assigned to this task
How many machines were used to execute this task
How many computer systems were used to execute this task
How many organizations were involved in this task
The extent to which personnel involved in this task were under the jurisdiction of
one organization
The different activities in the task interacted with each other in unpredictable
ways during the execution of the task
Different activities in this task provided feedback to each other during the
execution of the task
There was interdependence among the various activities in the task
There were uncertain relationships between the activities and the task outcome
A change in one activity had significant impacts on other activities during
execution of the task
The various activities in the task were very rigid with respect to time
The sequence by which the various activities were performed was very rigid
There were sufficient backup personnel in the executions of the task
There were sufficient redundancies of machines that were required for the task
There were sufficient slack in the time required for completing the task
This knowledge was frequently used by yourself in performing your tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by your organization in performing its tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by the EOC in performing its tasks
This knowledge improved your overall effectiveness
This knowledge improved the overall effectiveness of your organization
This knowledge improved the EOC’s overall effectiveness
This knowledge was frequently used by yourself in performing your tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by your organization in performing its tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by the EOC in performing its tasks
This knowledge improved your overall effectiveness
This knowledge improved the overall effectiveness of your organization
This knowledge improved the EOC’s overall effectiveness
This knowledge was frequently used by yourself in performing your tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by your organization in performing its tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by the EOC in performing its tasks
This knowledge improved your overall effectiveness
This knowledge improved the overall effectiveness of your organization
This knowledge improved the EOC’s overall effectiveness
The task was completed within the planned time schedule
The task was completed within the allocated budget
The task was completed within the planned number of person-hours
The task was completed with efficient use of all available resources
The task was completed satisfactorily for all participants
All incident requirements were met when the task was completed
The task was completed successfully without negatively impacting other tasks
The task was effectively completed despite any conflicting task requirements
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4.7 Data collection and sampling
The target respondents of the survey questionnaire were all the personnel who are
associated with the EOC as well as employees of other organizations and government
agencies that are called upon to participate in the EOC activities to respond to a disaster
event (such as a hurricane or wildfire). These respondents are experienced professionals
in their own organizations (such as FPL, BellSouth, etc.), who would typically have
participated in one or more emergency incidents at the EOC, and are familiar with how to
coordinate and manage some of the emergency tasks. They include the members of the
organizations who participate in the three branches mentioned in Section 4.6 (Human
Services group branch, Public Safety group branch, and Infrastructure group branch) and
those which are in the periphery of the EOC. Hence we deem this data collection
approach as a non-probability type of sampling method6.
The original list of numbers of potential participants that we obtained from the
EOC was as follows: Human Services group branch = 266, Public Safety group branch =
125, Infrastructure group branch = 75, EOC staff = 19, other contacts = 12 giving a total
of 497. The contact information consisted of the individual's name, company name,
department, title, contact phone number(s), and email address. We found that some of
the personnel had retired, moved, were no longer associated with the EOC activation
procedures, or had old email addresses or contact phone numbers and in such cases we
were not able to reach them. The number of potential participants we were finally able to
establish contact with was 311. The final number of responses we received was 120

6

As per our original expectations, the number of potential participants of the study was between 400 and
500 -- which would be a non-probability type of sampling.
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which gives an effective response rate of about 39%. Of these, 84 responses were filled
through the online web-based version and the remainder were obtained from other
sources such as mail-in of the paper version, faxes, etc.
One of the challenges in this research has been the limited number of potential
respondents to our survey since they have to be personnel involved in disaster operations
and who have had prior experience in emergency management tasks. Also past research
in emergency management with a knowledge management perspective has been sparse
and we have not been able to find prior procedures of evidence acquisition which can be
reused. Hence the data acquisition activity needed to be very timely and focused and we
planned three varied and flexible approaches.
We developed a web-based online version of the questionnaire using
SurveyMonkey, an online survey software tool, which provided us a professional, userfriendly design and a secure URL link for the participants to access the questionnaire.
We initially contacted them via a personalized email message requesting them to
complete the survey either through the online link or by filling out the paper-based
version that we sent as an attachment with the email. They were asked to complete the
questionnaires as part of a two-phase study on emergency management tasks and
knowledge management. They were told that their individual responses would be kept
strictly confidential and any results that were reported would be either anonymous
without personal details or in summary/aggregate form. Along with the email, we also
enclosed a letter of sponsorship and endorsement from the EOC coordinator to further
emphasize that the survey request was genuine and required for the research study. If we
did not receive a response, we followed up with another email message after every two
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weeks as a reminder for our original request. In many cases, we spent considerable time
towards responding to questions from the respondents by email and also discussing their
unique task assignments and specialized knowledge work by phone to expedite the
survey process.
The second approach we adopted was to send the potential participants mail
packages through the university bulk mail system, consisting of a personalized cover
letter, the paper version of the survey, copy of the EOC endorsement letter, and stamped
return envelopes so they could conveniently fill out the survey and mail it back to us.
This approach required additional time since we needed to call the offices of the
participant and speak to someone who could provide us the correct mailing address
including nuances such as department name, office building and so on. The third
approach was to personally meet the participants, briefly explain the purpose of the study
and the relevance to their work, and request them to fill out the paper-based version. In
some cases, the participants offered to delegate the questionnaire to someone else in their
unit who was more familiar with the work in Miami-Dade EOC activations. We were
able to help them complete the survey process expediently.

4.7.1 Sampling characteristics
We present below the characteristics of the data in terms of the respondent
profiles. We developed the respondent profiles in terms of two attributes: (1) the position
of the respondent in their respective organization and (2) number of years of emergency
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management experience. We categorized the respondent organizational position as
follows and noted the corresponding response percentages:
1) Senior management which corresponds to the organizational positions such as chief,
commander, president, and other executive and top management titles (20%)
2) Middle management which corresponds to organizational positions related to
managerial, supervisory, and coordination responsibilities (66%)
3) Other which captures all other positions (14%)
We categorized the number of years of emergency management experience as
follows and noted the corresponding response percentages:
1) Less than 5 years (35%)
2) From 5 to 14 years (37%)
3) More than 15 years (28%)
We see that most of the respondents had organizational positions entailing
significant amount of authority and responsibilities in their respective organizations.
Also many of the respondents had a considerable amount of experience in the emergency
management field. These attributes when viewed together suggest that it is important for
the personnel working on the emergency tasks to have sufficient knowledge, skills and
experience in their particular field as well as in emergency management.
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5. Data analysis and results
5.1 Data preparation and screening
The survey data was carefully screened for unusual patterns, non-response bias,
and outliers. The responses were reviewed to see if the survey participants were careful
and serious in completing the questionnaires. To examine non-response bias, we planned
to examine the dates on which the responses are received and make comparisons of early
responses and later responses on key demographic and item scores to see whether any
significant differences are revealed. If there were no significant differences, then we
would be able to conclude that response bias was not likely to be a problem.
We split the data into two halves based on the date the response was received.
Using the key variable for demographics (number of years worked in current
organization), Independent-Samples t test were conducted and the means for the two
groups of data for the main constructs were compared. These constructs are task
component complexity, task interactive complexity, task procedural rigidity, knowledge
integration, task efficiency, and task effectiveness.
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Construct

Result of t test

Years worked in current
organization (yrs_worked)
Knowledge Integration KI

Not significant

Efficiency

Significant at .05 level

Effectiveness

Not significant

Component complexity CC

Not significant

Interactive Complexity IC

Not significant

Procedural Rigidity PR

Significant at .05 level

Comments

Not significant
Mean difference is -0.47
(Mean values: 4.97 and 5.44)

Mean difference is -.53 (Mean
values: 4.25 and 4.78)

Table 8: Summary of tests to examine non-response bias
The results of the tests to examine non-response bias are explained as follows.
Five of the key constructs used in the research model indicate a difference in the mean
values of the two halves of the dataset to be non-significant. These constructs are: years
worked in current organization, knowledge integration, task efficiency, task
effectiveness, task component complexity, task interactive complexity, and task
procedural rigidity. This is a reasonably good measure to indicate that response bias is
not likely to be a problem in the survey data.
The two half sets of data are considered to represent the group of early and late
respondents respectively, the latter group serving as a proxy for the group that failed to
respond. The purpose of this test is to validate whether there is a possibility of the
presence of any systematic differences between the responses of the group that
participated in the survey and the group who we attempted to contact but failed to
respond. The tests indicate that overall there are no significant differences between the
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responses of the two groups of early and late respondents and therefore between the two
groups, one that responded and the other being the group that did not respond.
The measurement items were analyzed for possible outlier values. Our
consideration for an outlier value is based on the value beyond the mean plus/minus 3
SDs (Standard Deviations). In most cases we did not observe any outlier values. In the
few cases where we found outliers, we determined that the value was not a mistake, but
could actually be the value intended by the respondent for the particular task or
knowledge area.

5.2 Validity and reliability issues
As explained in sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, issues related to content validity (or
face validity) were addressed by following the guidelines for interviews with the site
managers, field observations, and the appropriate use of Q-sorting techniques.
Data Reliability
To assess the reliability of the measures indicated for the variables, Cronbach's
alpha coefficient will be estimated using SPSS for Windows application program. The
purpose of performing the analyses for reliability is to examine whether the items in the
instrument consistently represent the construct that is being measured (Green & Salkind,
2005). Thus for each set of measurement items for a specific variable (for example five
items for component task complexity, six items for integration of specific knowledge,
four items for task performance effectiveness, etc.), Cronbach's alpha will be computed
using SPSS and we will determine whether the value is adequate for judging the
reliability of the measures.
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This technique is based on the idea of split half reliability -- the dataset is split
into two halves randomly and for several participants the correlation between the two
halves is computed, the indicator of reliability being a large correlation (Field, 2005).
Cronbach's alpha is the average value obtained by computing the correlation coefficient
for every possible way in which the dataset can be split. Cronbach's alpha is defined as

where N is the number of components (items or testlets),
observed total test scores, and

is the variance of the

is the variance of component i.

We note that some of our measurement items are reverse scored. For example the
item "There were sufficient backup personnel in the execution of the task" for the task
attribute of Procedural Rigidity is phrased the opposite way for measuring the degree of
procedural rigidity of the task. A high score on this item (on the scale of 1 through 7)
actually indicates a low degree of procedural rigidity for the task. Before conducting the
reliability analysis, we will reverse the scale for such items which can be achieved in
SPSS by using the Transform and Compute options. We also note that there are two
versions of alpha: the normal and the standardized versions which we will use per these
guidelines. The normal alpha is considered appropriate when a single score for a scale is
produced by summing the items on the scale, and the standardized alpha is used when the
items on the scale are summed after they are standardized (Field, 2005).
The SPSS Reliability Analysis will provide the required statistics one of which is
the Corrected Item-Total Correlation. These values are the correlations between each
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item and the total score from the questionnaire (Green & Salkind, 2005). We expect that
if the scale is reliable, all items should correlate with the total and we will look for items
that don't correlate with the overall score from the scale. Then we will need to consider
whether items with low correlations may have to be dropped from the scale. We will also
examine the values labeled Alpha if Item is Deleted (which is the value of the overall
alpha if that item is not included in the calculation) and the value of Alpha which is the
Cronbach's alpha. Our expectation is that a value of more than 0.7 will be considered
adequate for judging the reliability.
5.3 Measurement validation
Factor analysis was conducted using SPSS for Windows software to identify
factors that statistically explain the variation and covariation among the measures that
have been identified in the study. For the purpose of this study, we plan exploratory
factor analysis to describe and summarize data by grouping together variables that are
correlated (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). We expect that exploratory factor analysis will
provide the tools to describe and understand the relationships among the variables in
preparation for testing the research hypotheses.
In this study, the research design is based on different sets of measures reflecting
the different dimensions of broader concepts: emergency task complexity, integration of
specific knowledge, and emergency task performance; factor analysis can yield factors
that represent these dimensions. As described in Table 5, we have identified five items
each for task component complexity, task interactive complexity, and task procedural
rigidity, six items for integration of specific knowledge, and four items each for task
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effectiveness and task efficiency. All measurement items associated with the same
construct should have high loadings on the same factor and relatively low loadings on
other factors (Green & Salkind, 2005).
We plan two stages for factor analysis: factor extraction and factor rotation
(Green & Salkind, 2005). The objective of the first stage is to make an observation about
the number of factors that underlie a set of measured variables. The purpose of the
second stage is to statistically manipulate the previous results to make the factors more
interpretable in the context of our study.
The analysis will be conducted using SPSS for Windows application. Based on
the techniques mentioned above, the following is a possible outline of the process using
the SPSS application program.
For factor extraction, we start with the options for Analyze, Data Reduction, and
then Factor, which takes us to the "Factor Analysis" dialog box. The initial statistics
from the factor extraction procedure show the eigenvalues for each factor component (an
eigenvalue is the amount of variance of the variables accounted for by a factor), which
are helpful in deciding how many factors should be used. A possible criterion will be to
retain all factors that have eigenvalues greater than 1 (this is the default value in SPSS).
The next stage after factor extraction is factor rotation. A possible outline of the
process using SPSS is conducting the analysis by choosing the menu option "Maximum
Likelihood", and the Varimax option for an orthogonal rotation of factors, assuming the
rotated factors may be uncorrelated. The resulting rotated factor matrix will show the
factor loadings, which are the correlations between each of the variables and the factors
selected for the rotation.
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This analysis also allows us to assess the convergent and discriminant validity of
the measurement items and the constructs. As mentioned earlier, all items associated
with the same construct should have high loadings on the construct (convergent validity)
and relatively low loadings on other factors (discriminant validity). This will support the
measure's validity that items should be more highly correlated with their own scales than
with other scales.
The tables below summarize the results of factor analysis conducted for the
constructs task interactive complexity, task procedural rigidity, context-specific
knowledge, and technology-specific knowledge.

5.3.1 Task interactive complexity measurement
The dimensionality of the 5 items used to measure task interactive complexity
was analyzed using maximum likelihood factor analysis. We determined the number of
factors to rotate based on the a priori hypothesis that the construct was unidimensional,
the eigenvalues, and interpretability of the factor solution. The initial hypothesis of
unidimensionality was incorrect and two factors were rotated using a Varimax rotation
procedure. The rotated solution yielded two interpretable factors: uncertainty and
interdependence. The first factor combines the items related to the "uncertainty"
component and the second factor has the items related to the "interdependence"
component. Table 9 shows the final results we obtained.
Further, coefficient alphas were computed to obtain internal consistency estimates
of reliability for the measures in each of the two factors. The values of Cronbach's Alpha
and Standardized Item Alpha for the "interdependence component" were .407 and .425
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respectively. It was decided to drop these items for following reasons: 1) The relatively
low value of Cronbach's Alpha for the measures being dropped indicates a low level of
internal reliability for these items and (2) the value of correlation between the two subconstructs is very low (less than 0.1).
In summary, the 2 items tc_int2 and tc_int3 were dropped for the construct Task
Interactive Complexity. The three items tc_int1, tc_int4, and tc_int5 will be retained for
further analysis. Table 9 summarizes these results.
Table 9: Task interactive complexity: Factor loadings
Task Interactive Complexity Items
tc_int1: The different activities in the task interacted with each
other in unpredictable ways during the execution of the task
tc_int4: There were uncertain relationships between the activities
and the task outcome
tc_int5: A change in one activity had significant impacts on other
activities during execution of the task
Note:
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

Factor Loadings

.721
.676
.428

5.3.2 Task procedural rigidity measurement
The dimensionality of the 5 items used to measure task procedural rigidity was
analyzed using maximum likelihood factor analysis. We determined the number of
factors to rotate based on the a priori hypothesis that the construct was unidimensional,
the eigenvalues, and interpretability of the factor solution. The initial hypothesis of
unidimensionality was incorrect and two factors were rotated using a Varimax rotation
procedure. The rotated solution yielded two interpretable factors: rigid and noslack. The
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first factor combines the items related to the "rigid" component and the second factor has
the items related to the "lack of slack" component. Table 10 shows the final results we
obtained.
Further, coefficient alphas were computed to obtain internal consistency estimates
of reliability for the measures in each of the two factors. The values of Cronbach's Alpha
and Standardized Item Alpha for the "lack of slack" component were .494 and .499
respectively. It was decided to drop these items for the following reasons: 1) The
relatively low value of Cronbach's Alpha for the measures being dropped indicates a low
level of internal reliability for these items and (2) the value of correlation between the
two sub-constructs of task procedural rigidity is very low (less than 0.1).
In summary, the three items tc_pr3, tc_pr4, and tc_pr5 will be dropped for the
construct Task Procedural Rigidity and the two items tc_pr1 and tc_pr2 will be retained
for further analysis. Table 10 summarizes these results.
Table 10: Task procedural rigidity: Factor loadings
Task Procedural Rigidity Items
tc_pr1: The various activities in the task were very rigid with
respect to time
tc_pr2: The sequence by which the various activities were
performed was very rigid
Note:
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
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Factor Loadings

.907
.722

5.3.3 Context-specific knowledge measurement

The dimensionality of the 4 items used to measure degree of context-specific
knowledge was analyzed using maximum likelihood factor analysis. We determined the
number of factors to rotate based on the a priori hypothesis that the construct was
unidimensional, the eigenvalues, and interpretability of the factor solution. The initial
hypothesis of unidimensionality was supported and the rotated solution yielded one
interpretable factors. Table 11 shows the final results we obtained.
Further, coefficient alphas were computed to obtain internal consistency estimates
of reliability for the measures of this construct. These values were computed first for all
4 items and then for 3 items after dropping sk_cxt3. We found that the value of
Cronbach's Alpha obtained for all 4 items was 0.677 indicating a low level of internal
reliability. After dropping 1 item, the value of Cronbach's Alpha (and the value of
Standardized Item Alpha) improved to .798 which will be considered as acceptable for
internal reliability.
In summary, the item sk_cxt3 was dropped for the construct Context-specific
knowledge and the three items sk_cxt1, sk_cxt2, and sk_cxt4 will be retained for further
analysis. Table 11 summarizes these results.
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Context-specific Knowledge Items
sk_cxt2: This knowledge is related to particular situations and
place
sk_cxt4: Application of this knowledge is contingent upon
particular circumstances & events
sk_cxt1: This knowledge is related to particular circumstances of
time
Note:
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

Factor Loadings

.871
.825
.798

Table 11: Context-specific knowledge: Factor loadings

5.3.4 Technology-specific knowledge measurement
The dimensionality of the 4 items used to measure the degree of technologyspecific knowledge was analyzed using maximum likelihood factor analysis. We
determined the number of factors to rotate based on the a priori hypothesis that the
construct was unidimensional, the eigenvalues, and interpretability of the factor solution.
The initial hypothesis of unidimensionality was incorrect and two factors were rotated
using a Varimax rotation procedure. The rotated solution yielded two interpretable
factors and Table 12 shows the final results we obtained.
Further, coefficient alphas were computed to obtain internal consistency estimates
of reliability for the measures for the first factor and then for all 4 items. The value of
Cronbach's Alpha obtained for all 4 items was 0.483 indicating a low level of internal
reliability. After dropping 1 item, the value of Cronbach's Alpha and the Standardized
Item Alpha improved to some extent (.629 and .630 respectively) which will be
considered as marginally acceptable for internal reliability.
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In summary, the item sk_tech4 was dropped for the construct Technology-specific
knowledge and the three items sk_tech1, sk_tech2, and sk_tech3 were retained for further
analysis. Table 12 summarizes these results.

Technology-specific Knowledge Items
sk_tech3: This knowledge makes use of tools & techniques
specific to a particular discipline
sk_tech2: This knowledge has rules specific to a particular
discipline
sk_tech1: This knowledge can be taught through formal training
& education
Note:
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

Factor Loadings

.832
.818
.614

Table 12: Technology-specific knowledge: Factor loadings

5.4 Summary of reliability testing
To assess the reliability of the measures of each of the multi-scale items
associated with the constructs, we estimated the value of Cronbach's alpha coefficient
using SPSS 1.4 for Windows application program. This analyses will indicate whether
the items in the instrument consistently represent the construct that is being measured
(Green & Salkind, 2005).
Thus for each set of measurement items for a specific construct (for example five
items for component task complexity, six items for integration of specific knowledge,
four items for task performance effectiveness, etc.), Cronbach's alpha was computed
using SPSS and we determined whether the value is adequate for judging the reliability of
the measures using a threshold value of 0.7.
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Table 13 summarizes these results:
Construct and
Measures
Knowledge Integration KI
(ki1, ki2, ki3, ki4, ki5, ki6)
Task Efficiency
(t_efcy1, t_efcy2, t_efcy3,
t_efcy4)
Task Effectiveness
(t_efts1, t_efts2, t_efts3,
t_efts4)
Task Component Complexity
CC - Standardized
(nbr_people, nbr_mach,
nbr_sys, nbr_org)
Task Interactive Complexity
IC (tc_int1, tc_int4, tc_int5)
Task Procedural Rigidity PR
(tc_pr1, tc_pr2)

Cronbach's
Alpha

Standardized
Item Alpha

N number
of items

Comments

0.764

0.786

6

Satisfactory

0.824

0.821

4

Satisfactory

0.844

0.845

4

Satisfactory

0.739

0.714

4

Satisfactory

0.623

0.621

3

0.786

0.786

2

Marginally
acceptable
Satisfactory

Table 13: Cronbach's alpha values for reliability testing

The reliability tests indicate a satisfactory value of Cronbach's Alpha (greater than
0.7) for the key constructs in the research model. The value of Cronbach's Alpha for
Task Interactive Complexity is 0.623 and will be considered as marginally acceptable.

5.5 Hypotheses testing
In order to test the level of support for each hypothesis, a series of multiple
regression analyses will be performed using SPSS for Windows at a 5% level of
significance (α = 0.05). The purpose of the model testing is for path analysis and not for
testing the measurement and structure of the model.
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As indicated earlier in the research model, the independent (predictor) variable is
task complexity (TC) which we treat as a multidimensional construct of three dimensions
-- component task complexity (CC), interactive task complexity (IC), and procedural
rigidity (PR). The dependent (criterion) variable is emergency task performance (TP) of
two dimensions -- task effectiveness and task efficiency. The mediating variable is
knowledge integration (KI) that partially accounts for the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The measurement for
each of these constructs was obtained by calculating the mean of the response values of
the measurement items used for the corresponding construct. For the task component
complexity construct, we calculated the mean of the standardized values of the responses
for the corresponding measurement items.
The summaries of the regression test analyses that were conducted are described
below. Treating task complexity as a multidimensional construct, we examined the
effects of the three task complexity dimensions as well as knowledge integration on task
effectiveness and task efficiency.
The hypotheses based on the research model (which were explained in Chapter 3) are
reproduced here for the reader's convenience.
H1a) Component complexity of tasks is negatively associated with task effectiveness
H1b) Interactive complexity of tasks is negatively associated with task effectiveness
H1c) Procedural rigidity of tasks is negatively associated with task effectiveness
H2a) Component complexity of tasks is negatively associated with task efficiency
H2b) Interactive complexity of tasks is negatively associated with task efficiency
H2c) Procedural rigidity of tasks is negatively associated with task efficiency
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5.6 Summary of path analyses
In this section we describe how the path analysis was conducted for the main
constructs of task complexity, knowledge integration, and task performance. Three sets
of multiple regression tests were conducted to explore the relationships between task
complexity, knowledge integration, and task performance. In the first set, the
independent variables were task component complexity, task interactive complexity, and
task procedural rigidity, while the dependent variable was knowledge integration. In the
second set, knowledge integration was included as the independent variable along with
the three constructs for task complexity, while the dependent variable was task efficiency.
In the third set of regression testing, the independent variables were the same as the
second set, while the dependent variable was task effectiveness.
1) Regression of Task Complexity and Knowledge Integration
2) Regression of Task Complexity, Knowledge Integration, and Efficiency
3) Regression of Task Complexity, Knowledge Integration, and Effectiveness
as represented by the following equations:
KI = f (CC, IC, PR)
Efficiency = f (CC, IC, PR, KI)
Effectiveness = f (CC, IC, PR, KI)
The following table summarizes the results of these analyses showing the
individual values of standardized beta coefficients, t-statistic and the statistically
significant level.
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Independent
Variable

CC
IC
PR
KI

Dependent Variable
KI
Standardized t-statistic
β coefficient

Efficiency
Standardized t-statistic
β coefficient

Effectiveness
Standardized t-statistic
β coefficient

0.187*
0.048
-0.008
--

-0.169*
-0.334***
0.224*
0.243**

-0.241**
-0.209*
+
0.157
0.341***

2.039
0.505
-0.082
--

2

Adj R =0.011; F=1.434

-1.963
-3.808
2.557
2.816

2

-2.794
-2.385
1.794
3.957

2

Adj R =0.155; F=6.429*** Adj R =0.156; F =6.473***
+

Note: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; p < 0.1

Table 14: Summary of path analyses
Based on the above table we now describe the results of our analyses and how
they tie back to our hypotheses. The standardized β coefficient between task component
complexity and task effectiveness was negative and significant (-0.241, p < .01). This
result provides support for the hypothesis that task component complexity is negatively
associated with task effectiveness. The standardized β coefficient between task
interactive complexity and task effectiveness was negative and significant (-0.209, p <
.05), which provides support for the hypothesis that task interactive complexity is
negatively associated with task effectiveness. The standardized β coefficient between
task procedural rigidity and task effectiveness was positive and marginally significant
(0.157, p < .1). This did not support our expectation that task procedural rigidity is
negatively associated with task effectiveness.
The standardized β coefficient between task component complexity and task
efficiency was negative and significant (-0.169, p < .05). This result provides support for
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the hypothesis that task component complexity is negatively associated with task
efficiency. The standardized β coefficient between task interactive complexity and task
efficiency was negative and significant (-0.334, p < .001), which provides support for the
hypothesis that task interactive complexity is negatively associated with task efficiency.
The standardized β coefficient between task procedural rigidity and task efficiency was
positive and significant (0.224, p < .05). This did not support our expectation that task
procedural rigidity is negatively associated with task efficiency.
The value of standardized β coefficient between knowledge integration and task
effectiveness was positive and significant (0.341, p < .001) which provides strong support
for our hypothesis that integration of specific knowledge is positively associated with
task effectiveness. The value of standardized β coefficient between knowledge
integration and task efficiency was positive and significant (0.243, p < .01) which
provides strong support for our hypothesis that integration of specific knowledge is
positively associated with task efficiency.
Further more we report an additional finding which was not in the original
hypothesis, but is relevant to the research model and the path analysis. The value of
standardized β coefficient between task component complexity and knowledge
integration was positive and significant (0.187, p < .05) which indicates that task
component complexity is positively associated with integration of specific knowledge.
The table below summarizes the hypotheses and our findings through path analyses.
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Hypothesis

H1a
H1b
H1c
H2a
H2b
H2c
H3
H4

Component complexity of tasks is negatively
associated with task effectiveness
Interactive complexity of tasks is negatively associated
with task effectiveness
Procedural rigidity of tasks is negatively associated
with task effectiveness
Component complexity of tasks is negatively
associated with task efficiency
Interactive complexity of tasks is negatively associated
with task efficiency
Procedural rigidity of tasks is negatively associated
with task efficiency
Integration of specific knowledge is positively
associated with task effectiveness
Integration of specific knowledge is positively
associated with task efficiency
Component complexity of tasks is positively
associated with knowledge integration

Table 15: Summary of hypotheses and findings

101

Research Finding

Strong support
Supported
Marginal support but
reverse direction
Supported
Strong support
Supported but reverse
direction
Strong support
Strong support
Supported (not in
original hypothesis)

Figure 13: Summary of path analyses

Knowledge
Integration

.187*

.243**
-.169*

Component
Complexity

Task
Efficiency

-.334***
.224*

.341***

Interactive
Complexity

-.241**
-.209*
.157

Procedural
Rigidity

Task
Complexity

Task
Effectiveness

Knowledge
Integration
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5.7 Summary of path analyses with control variables
The following control variables are used in this part of the analysis representing
some of the data corresponding to the respondent's demographic attributes:
1) Number of years worked in current organization: This is a measure of the knowledge
and expertise of the respondent in the designated field (yrs-work)
2) Total number of years worked in emergency management: This is a measure of the
knowledge and experience of the respondent in emergency management (yrs_tot)

In this section we describe the path analysis conducted for the main constructs
task complexity, knowledge integration, task performance, and the control variables.
Three sets of multiple regression tests were conducted to explore the relationships
between task complexity, control variables, knowledge integration, and task performance.
In the first set, the independent variables were task component complexity, task
interactive complexity, task procedural rigidity, and the two control variables, while the
dependent variable was knowledge integration. In the second set, knowledge integration
was included as the independent variable along with the three constructs for task
complexity and control variables, while the dependent variable was task efficiency. In
the third set of regression testing, the independent variables were the same as the second
set, while the dependent variable was task effectiveness.
1) Regression of Task Complexity, Control variables, and Knowledge Integration
2) Regression of Task Complexity, Control Variables, Knowledge Integration, and
Efficiency
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3) Regression of Task Complexity, Control Variables, Knowledge Integration, and
Effectiveness
as represented by the following equations:
KI = f (CC, IC, PR, CV1, CV2)
Efficiency = f (CC, IC, PR, KI, CV1, CV2)
Effectiveness = f (CC, IC, PR, KI, CV1, CV2)
The following table summarizes the results of these analyses showing the individual
values of standardized beta coefficients, t-statistic and the statistically significant level.

Independent
Variable

Dependent Variable
KI
Standardized t-statistic
β coefficient

CC
IC
PR
CV1
CV2
KI

+

0.178
0.058
-0.015
-0.020
-0.087
-2

1.922
0.601
-0.155
-0.216
-0.927
--

Adj R =0.002; F=1.050

Efficiency
Standardized t-statistic
β coefficient

Effectiveness
Standardized t-statistic
β coefficient

-0.187*
-0.306***
0.206*
-0.045
-0.229**
0.220**

-0.251**
-0.199*
+
0.149
-0.042
-0.100
0.330***

-2.218
-3.514
2.403
-0.538
-2.701
2.613

2

2

-2.889
-2.225
1.691
-0.482
-1.151
3.814

Adj R =0.199; F=5.882*** Adj R =0.155; F =4.599***
+

Note: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; p < 0.1

Table 16: Summary of path analyses with control variables
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Based on the results, we note that no major differences in the magnitude and
direction of the relationships between the key constructs were noted after the control
variables were included in the regression tests (in other words the story remains the
same).

.178*

Knowledge
Integration

.220**
-.187*

Component
Complexity

Task
Efficiency

-.306***
.206*

.330***

Interactive
Complexity

-.251**
-.199*

Task
Effectiveness

.149

Procedural
Rigidity

Control Variables
• Experience in current organization
• Experience in emergency management

Task
Complexity

Knowledge
Integration

Figure 14: Summary of path analyses with control variables
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5.8 Moderating effects of specific knowledge
To evaluate the level of specific knowledge (context, technology, or context-and
technology) that was required to execute a particular emergency task, we adopted a
methodology based on the median values of each of the constructs for specific
knowledge. The median values for context-specific knowledge and technology-specific
knowledge as determined through Descriptive Statistics tests in SPSS, were each 5.33.
We segregated the data into two groups: the first group contained the cases for which the
values of the specific knowledge construct were less than the median value of 5.33 and
the second group contained the cases for which the values of the specific knowledge
construct were greater than or equal to the median value of 5.33.
Subsequently, the first group represents the emergency tasks which were
performed using a relatively low level of the specific knowledge and the second group
represents those emergency tasks which required a relatively high level of specific
knowledge. As explained in Section 3.5, the notion of a relatively low level of specific
knowledge would imply a higher level of general knowledge required for the task. The
regression path analyses described in the previous sections were again performed for each
of the two groups of data, thus enabling us to examine any particular similarities or
differences in the respective outcomes.
Our expectation is that the nature of the relationship between task complexity,
knowledge integration, and task performance depends on the extent to which the area of
knowledge is general (low specificity) or context-specific or technology-specific. For
example, we can observe if the relationship between task component complexity and task

106

efficiency remains the same or is different for the two levels of context-specific
knowledge; furthermore in the latter case, we are interested in what the particular
differences are and what can be inferred from these observations. In the following
sections, the details of these tests, the analyses and our observations have been described.

5.8.1 Moderating effects of context-specific knowledge
For each of the two groups of data (Context-specific knowledge less/greater than
median value 5.33), three sets of multiple regression tests were conducted to explore the
relationships between task complexity, knowledge integration, and task performance.
We are particularly interested in observing how the level of context-specific knowledge
affects the strength and direction of the relationship between task complexity and task
performance. In the first set, the independent variables were task component complexity,
task interactive complexity, and task procedural rigidity, while the dependent variable
was knowledge integration. In the second set, knowledge integration was included as the
independent variable along with the three constructs for task complexity, while the
dependent variable was task efficiency. In the third set of regression testing, the
independent variables were the same as the second set, while the dependent variable was
task effectiveness. In summary,
1) Path analyses of task complexity and knowledge integration (2 groups for level of
context-specific knowledge less/greater than 5.33)
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2) Path analyses of task complexity, knowledge integration, and efficiency (2 groups
for level of context-specific knowledge less/greater than 5.33)
3) Path analyses of task complexity, knowledge integration, and effectiveness (2 groups
for level of context-specific knowledge less/greater than 5.33)

We now discuss the results of regression of task complexity and knowledge
integration as represented by the equation KI = f (CC, IC, PR).

Independent
Variable

CC
IC
PR

Dependent Variable KI
Context-specific knowledge < 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

Context-specific knowledge >= 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

0.262
-0.105
0.112

0.208
0.098
-0.134

+

1.506
-0.558
0.635

2

1.694
0.786
-1.105

2

Note: Adj R = -.012; F=.846
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Adj R =0.015; F=1.352

Table 17: Path analyses knowledge integration and context-specific knowledge

From the above table we see that the standardized β coefficient between task
component complexity and knowledge integration was positive and somewhat significant
(0.208, p < 0.1) when the level of context-specific knowledge was greater than 5.33.
However when the level of context-specific knowledge was less than 5.33, this
relationship was not significant. This result indicates that when the level of contextspecific knowledge is greater than the median value, the impact of component complexity
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is greater on knowledge integration as compared to the impact when the knowledge is
more general. This implies that emergency operations managers need to invest in
knowledge integration strategies even more so when there are many personnel and
organizations involved in a task and thereby strive to reduce their dependence on the
expertise and skills of few specialized personnel.
We now discuss the results of path analyses of task complexity, knowledge
integration, and efficiency as represented by Efficiency = f (CC, IC, PR, KI).

Independent
Variable

CC
IC
PR
KI

Dependent Variable: Efficiency
Context-specific knowledge < 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

Context-specific knowledge >= 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

-0.062
-0.492**
+
0.320
0.008

-0.185
-0.283*
-0.187
0.322**

-0.381
-2.861
1.988
0.050

2

2

Note: Adj R =0.161; F = 2.866*
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

-1.565
-2.393
1.611
2.765

Adj R =0.119; F=3.327

+

Table 18: Path analyses efficiency and context-specific knowledge
1) The value of the standardized β coefficient between task interactive complexity and
efficiency was negative and significant (-0.492, p < 0.01) when the level of contextspecific knowledge was less than 5.33. It was also negative and significant (-0.283, p <
0.05) when the level of context-specific knowledge was greater than 5.33. These results
indicate that task interactive complexity has significant negative effects on task efficiency
when the integrative knowledge involved is general as well as context-specific; however,
the results indicate that there is a greater negative effect on efficiency when the
knowledge is more general. As explained in Section 5.6 the negative effect of task
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interactive complexity can be compensated by the integration of specific knowledge used
in the task.
2) The value of the standardized β coefficient between knowledge integration and
efficiency was positive and significant (0.322, p < 0.01) when the level of contextspecific knowledge was greater than 5.33. This indicates that the impact of knowledge
integration on efficiency depends on the level of context-specific knowledge used for the
task performance -- when the level of context-specific knowledge is high, then the impact
is greater and significant. Hence when dealing with such tasks, it is beneficial to invest in
knowledge integration to improve the task outcome in terms of efficiency. This also
indicates that "one size does not fit all" and the same degree of knowledge integration
need not be applied for all tasks.
3) From the standpoint of managerial implications, the results suggest that potentially
higher benefits can be gained by being selective in knowledge integration strategies for
tasks that require different levels of context-specific knowledge. Some tasks may require
a particularly higher level of context-specific knowledge whereas more general
knowledge is required for working other tasks.
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We now discuss the results of path analyses of task complexity, knowledge
integration, and effectiveness as Effectiveness = f (CC, IC, PR, KI).
Independent
Variable

CC
IC
PR
KI
2

Dependent Variable: Effectiveness
Context-specific knowledge < 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

Context-specific knowledge >= 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

0.034
+
-0.327
-0.098
0.315*

-0.379**
+
-0.210
0.229*
0.325**

0.206
-1.877
-0.600
2.051
+

-3.324
-1.839
2.051
2.891

2

Note: Adj R =0.138; F = 2.567
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.01

Adj R = 0.181; F=4.806**

Table 19: Path analyses effectiveness and context-specific knowledge

1) The value of the standardized β coefficient between task component complexity and
effectiveness was negative and significant (-0.379, p < 0.01) when the level of contextspecific knowledge was greater than 5.33. Thus when the integrative knowledge was
context-specific, the negative impact of component complexity on effectiveness is greater
and significant. This also indicates that component complexity has significant negative
effect on task effectiveness when the integrative knowledge is context-specific.
2) The value of the standardized β coefficient between task procedural rigidity and
effectiveness was positive and significant (0.229, p < 0.05) when the level of contextspecific knowledge was greater than 5.33. Thus the impact of task procedural rigidity on
task effectiveness becomes positive with higher specific knowledge. This seems to
suggest that emergency organization planners have drawn elaborate and comprehensive
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policies and procedures for tasks that are dependent on a high level of context-specific
knowledge for their execution.
3) The value of the standardized β coefficient between task interactive complexity and
effectiveness was negative and somewhat significant (-0.327, p < 0.1) when the level of
context-specific knowledge was less than 5.33. It was also negative and somewhat
significant (-0.210, p < 0.1) when the level of context-specific knowledge was greater
than 5.33. These results indicate that task interactive complexity has negative effects on
task effectiveness when the integrative knowledge involved is general as well as contextspecific; however, the results indicate that there is a greater negative effect on
effectiveness when the knowledge is more general.
4) The value of the standardized β coefficient between knowledge integration and
effectiveness was positive and significant (0.315, p < 0.05) when the level of contextspecific knowledge was less than 5.33; it was also positive and significant (0.325, p <
0.01) when the level of context-specific knowledge was greater than 5.33. This indicates
that the impact of knowledge integration on effectiveness is significant for all levels of
context-specific knowledge, but somewhat greater when the integrative knowledge is
context-specific.
5) From a planning perspective for managerial implications, we use the analogy of
"modularity" to explain a flexible design as a better alternative when the degree of
component complexity in a task is high. Since when the knowledge is highly contextspecific it has a greater impact on effectiveness, the components should be more modular
or general purpose to reduce this impact. In other words, the personnel and the
organizations responsible for the task should try to share common knowledge and
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communicate across organizational or functional barriers to get the job done. The
"stickiness" of the context-specific knowledge is important to correct the negative effects
of complexity; for example by using more general knowledge to understand the other
person's perspectives while focusing on the context-specific knowledge to solve a
problem.

5.8.2 Moderating effects of technology-specific knowledge
For each of the two groups of data (Technology-specific knowledge less/greater
than median value 5.33), three sets of multiple regression tests were conducted to explore
the relationships between task complexity, knowledge integration, and task performance.
In the first set, the independent variables were task component complexity, task
interactive complexity, and task procedural rigidity, while the dependent variable was
knowledge integration. In the second set, knowledge integration was included as the
independent variable along with the three constructs for task complexity, while the
dependent variable was task efficiency. In the third set of regression testing, the
independent variables were the same as the second set, while the dependent variable was
task effectiveness.
1) Path analyses of task complexity and knowledge integration (2 groups for level of
technology-specific knowledge less/greater than 5.33)
2) Path analyses of task complexity, knowledge integration, and efficiency (2 groups
for level of technology-specific knowledge less/greater than 5.33)
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3) Path analyses of task complexity, knowledge integration, and effectiveness (2 groups
for level of technology-specific knowledge less/greater than 5.33)

We now discuss the results of path analyses of task complexity and knowledge
integration as represented by KI = f (CC, IC, PR).

Independent
Variable

Dependent Variable: KI
Tech-specific knowledge < 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient
+

CC
IC
PR

0.249
0.039
0.175

1.693
0.256
1.168

Tech-specific knowledge >= 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient
0.147
0.016
-0.240

2

1.130
0.122
-1.862

2

Note: Adj R =0.038; F=1.614
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Adj R =0.037; F=1.789

Table 20: Path analyses knowledge integration and technology-specific knowledge

From the above table we see that the standardized β coefficient between task
component complexity and knowledge integration was positive and somewhat significant
(0.249, p < 0.1) when the level of technology-specific knowledge was less than 5.33
(indicating the integrative knowledge was general). However when the level of
technology-specific knowledge was greater than 5.33, this relationship was not
significant. This result seems to indicate that when the integrative knowledge is more
general, the impact of component complexity is greater on knowledge integration as
compared to the impact when the technology knowledge is more specific.
We note that these results would suggest that it is relatively more difficult to
integrate knowledge when the level of technological specificity is high. Special effort
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would be required to share such type of knowledge among the responsible individuals
and organizations assigned to these tasks (for example, FEMA courses and training) so
that at the time of the emergency event it is easier for them to understand how to quickly
apply and use the knowledge for solving a problem.

We now discuss the results of path analyses of task complexity, knowledge
integration, and efficiency as represented by Efficiency = f (CC, IC, PR, KI).
Independent
Variable

CC
IC
PR
KI

Dependent Variable: Efficiency
Tech-specific knowledge < 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

Tech-specific knowledge >= 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

-0.326*
-0.456**
+
0.258
0.407**

0.004
+
-0.260
0.159
0.023

-2.534
-3.524
2.006
3.197

2

0.033
-1.931
1.181
0.173

2

Note: Adj R =0.314; F=6.368***
+
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; p < 0.1

Adj R =0.009; F=1.142

Table 21: Path analyses efficiency and technology-specific knowledge

1) From the above table we see that the standardized β coefficient between task
component complexity and efficiency was negative and significant (-0.326, p < 0.05)
when the level of technology-specific knowledge was less than 5.33. Also the
standardized β coefficient between task interactive complexity and efficiency was
negative and significant (-0.456, p < 0.01) when the level of technology-specific
knowledge was less than 5.33. Thus when the task is characterized by interactive
complexity and the integrative knowledge is general, there is a negative effect on task
effectiveness. When the level of technology-specific knowledge was greater than 5.33,
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the standardized β coefficient between task interactive complexity and efficiency was
negative and somewhat significant (-0.260, p < 0.1).
These results indicate that both task component complexity and interactive
complexity have a negative effect on task efficiency when the integrative knowledge is
more general. When the level of technology-specific knowledge is greater than the
median value, the impact of component complexity on efficiency is not significant and
the impact of interactive complexity on efficiency is reduced. The implications are that,
the level of technology-specific knowledge is important to reduce the negative effect of
task complexity on efficiency.
2) The standardized β coefficient between knowledge integration and efficiency was
positive and significant (0.407, p < 0.01) when the level of technology-specific
knowledge was less than 5.33. This indicates that the impact of knowledge integration on
efficiency depends on the level of technology-specific knowledge used for the task
performance -- when the integrative knowledge is more general, then the impact is
greater and significant. Hence when dealing with such tasks, it is beneficial to invest in
knowledge integration to improve the task outcome in terms of efficiency. This also
indicates that "one size does not fit all" and the same degree of knowledge integration
need not be applied for all tasks.
3) We reflect on this finding in conjunction with the earlier finding that it is relatively
more difficult to integrate specific knowledge when the level of technological specificity
is high. As suggested in (2) above we need to consider other types of complementary
knowledge management systems when dealing with activities with a level of technologyspecific knowledge.
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We now discuss the results of path analyses of task complexity, knowledge
integration, and effectiveness as represented by Effectiveness = f (CC, IC, PR, KI).
Independent
Variable

CC
IC
PR
KI

Dependent Variable: Effectiveness
Tech-specific knowledge < 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

Tech-specific knowledge >= 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

-0.411**
-0.296*
0.147
0.427**

0.089
+
-0.258
-0.015
0.096

-3.042
-2.178
1.089
3.190

2

0.670
-1.918
-0.109
0.726

2

Note: Adj R =0.242; F=4.753**
+
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; p < 0.1

Adj R =0.009; F=1.137

Table 22: Path analyses effectiveness and technology-specific knowledge

1) From the above table we see that the standardized β coefficient between task
component complexity and effectiveness was negative and significant (-0.411, p < 0.01)
when the level of technology-specific knowledge was less than 5.33. Also the
standardized β coefficient between task interactive complexity and effectiveness was
negative and significant (-0.296, p < 0.05) when the level of technology-specific
knowledge was less than 5.33. When the level of technology-specific knowledge was
greater than 5.33, the standardized β coefficient between task interactive complexity and
effectiveness was negative and somewhat significant (-0.258, p < 0.1).
These results indicate that both task component complexity and interactive
complexity have a negative effect on task effectiveness when the integrative knowledge
is more general. When the integrative knowledge is technology-specific, the impact of
component complexity on effectiveness is not significant and the impact of interactive
complexity on effectiveness is somewhat reduced. The implications are that the level of
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technology-specific knowledge is important to reduce the negative effect of task
complexity on effectiveness.
2) The standardized β coefficient between knowledge integration and effectiveness was
positive and significant (0.427, p < 0.01) when the level of technology-specific
knowledge was less than 5.33. This indicates that the impact of knowledge integration on
effectiveness depends on the level of technology-specific knowledge used for the task
performance -- when the integrative knowledge is more general, then the impact is
greater and significant. Hence when dealing with such tasks, it is beneficial to invest in
knowledge integration to improve the task outcome in terms of effectiveness. This also
indicates that "one size does not fit all" and the same degree of knowledge integration
need not be applied for all tasks.

5.8.3 Moderating effects of context-and-technology-specific knowledge
For each of the two groups of data (context-and-technology-specific knowledge
less/greater than median value 5.33), three sets of multiple regression tests were
conducted to explore the relationships between task complexity, knowledge integration,
and task performance. In the first set, the independent variables were task component
complexity, task interactive complexity, and task procedural rigidity, while the dependent
variable was knowledge integration. In the second set, knowledge integration was
included as the independent variable along with the three constructs for task complexity,
while the dependent variable was task efficiency. In the third set of regression testing,
the independent variables were the same as the second set, while the dependent variable
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was task effectiveness. (In the following sections, the term "Context-and-technologyspecific knowledge" has been abbreviated to "C-and-T-specific knowledge").
In summary,
1) Path analyses of task complexity and knowledge integration (2 groups for level of
C-and-T-specific knowledge less/greater than 5.33)
2) Path analyses of task complexity, knowledge integration, and efficiency (2 groups
for level of C-and-T-specific knowledge less/greater than 5.33)
3) Path analyses of task complexity, knowledge integration, and effectiveness (2 groups
for level of C-and-T-specific knowledge less/greater than 5.33)

We now discuss the results of path analyses of task complexity and knowledge
integration as represented by KI = f (CC, IC, PR).
Independent
Variable

CC
IC
PR

Dependent Variable: KI
C-and-T-specific knowledge < 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

C-and-T-specific knowledge >= 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

0.185
-0.271
0.539*

0.071
0.067
-0.254

0.816
-1.075
2.260

2

0.449
0.412
-1.623

2

Note: Adj R =0.141; F=2.152
+
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.01; p < 0.1

Adj R =-0.004; F=0.943

Table 23: Path analyses knowledge integration and context-and-technology-specific
knowledge

From the above table we see that the standardized β coefficient between task
procedural rigidity and knowledge integration was positive and significant (0.539, p <
0.05) when the level of C-and-T-specific knowledge was less than 5.33. This result
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seems to indicate that when the integrative knowledge is more general, the impact of
procedural rigidity is greater on knowledge integration as compared to the impact when
the C-and-T knowledge has a higher level of specificity. This finding suggests that
integration of specific knowledge is more difficult to accomplish when the levels of
specificity of the two types of specific knowledge, context and technology are relatively
high.
We now discuss the results of path analyses of task complexity, knowledge
integration, and efficiency as represented by Efficiency = f (CC, IC, PR, KI).
Independent
Variable

CC
IC
PR
KI

Dependent Variable: Efficiency
C-and-T-specific knowledge < 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

C-and-T-specific knowledge >= 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

0.149
-0.804**
0.301
0.120

0.278
-0.352*
0.020
0.095

+

0.739
-3.528
1.270
0.582

2

1.809
-2.245
0.126
0.623

2

Note: Adj R =0.342; F=3.723*
+
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.01; p < 0.1

Adj R =0.068; F=1.789

Table 24: Path analyses of task efficiency and context-and-technology-specific
knowledge
From the above table we see that the standardized β coefficient between task
component complexity and efficiency was positive and somewhat significant (0.278, p <
0.1) when the level of C-and-T-specific knowledge was greater than 5.33. This result
indicates that when the level of context-and-technology-specific knowledge is relatively
high, task component complexity has a positive impact on efficiency.
The standardized β coefficient between task interactive complexity and efficiency
was negative and significant (-0.804, p < 0.01) when the level of C-and-T-specific
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knowledge was less than 5.33. Also the standardized β coefficient between task
interactive complexity and efficiency was negative and significant (-0.352, p < 0.05)
when the level of C-and-T-specific knowledge was greater than 5.33. These results
indicate that when the integrative knowledge is both context and technology specific, the
negative impact of task interactive complexity on efficiency is reduced.
Overall, these results are also in conformity with our earlier findings that the
levels of context-specific and technology-specific knowledge are important to neutralize
the impacts of task complexity in general on the task efficiency.

We now discuss the results of path analyses of task complexity, knowledge
integration, and effectiveness as represented by Effectiveness = f (CC, IC, PR, KI).
Independent
Variable

CC
IC
PR
KI

Dependent Variable: Effectiveness
C-and-T-specific knowledge < 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

C-and-T-specific knowledge >= 5.33
Standardized β
t-statistic
coefficient

0.153
+
-0.515
-0.092
0.298

0.133
-0.344*
0.020
-0.014

0.674
-2.009
-0.346
1.282

2

0.842
-2.139
0.126
-0.091

2

Note: Adj R =0.167; F=2.049
+
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.01; p < 0.1

Adj R =0.018; F=1.195

Table 25: Path analyses task effectiveness and context-and-technology-specific
knowledge
The standardized β coefficient between task interactive complexity and
effectiveness was negative and somewhat significant (-0.515, p < 0.1) when the level of
C-and-T-specific knowledge was less than 5.33. Also the standardized β coefficient
between task interactive complexity and effectiveness was negative and significant (-
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0.344, p < 0.05) when the level of C-and-T-specific knowledge was greater than 5.33.
These results indicate that at relatively higher levels of context-and-technology-specific
knowledge, the negative impact of task interactive complexity on effectiveness is
reduced.
Again, these results are in conformity with our earlier findings that the levels of
context-specific and technology-specific knowledge are important to neutralize the
impacts of task complexity in general on the task effectiveness.
5.8.4 Summary of moderating effects hypotheses

We replicate below the hypotheses stated earlier for the research model (Chapter
3) for our expectations regarding the relationships between integration of specific
knowledge and task performance. On the basis of the analyses and results discussed in
the prior sections, we summarize our findings in the following table.

H3a
H3b
H3c

H4a
H4b
H4c

Hypothesis

Research Finding

Integration of context-specific knowledge is
positively associated with task effectiveness
Integration of technology-specific knowledge is
positively associated with task effectiveness
Integration of context-and-technology-specific
knowledge is positively associated with task
effectiveness
Integration of context-specific knowledge is
positively associated with task efficiency
Integration of technology-specific knowledge is
positively associated with task efficiency
Integration of context-and-technology-specific
knowledge is positively associated with task
efficiency

Strong support for both general and
context-specific knowledge
Strong support for general knowledge

Table 26: Summary of moderating effects hypotheses
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Results were not significant
Strong support for context-specific
knowledge
Strong support for general knowledge

Results were not significant

5.9 Mediating effect of knowledge integration
As explained in Section 3.6, the mediating variable (integration of specific
knowledge) explains how or why the predictor or independent variable (task complexity
dimensions -- component, interactive, procedural rigidity) affects the criterion or
dependent variable (task performance dimensions -- efficiency, effectiveness). As shown
in the figure below, there are two paths which feed into the outcome or dependent
variable: the direct impact of the independent variable (path c) and the impact of the
mediating variable (path b). In addition, there is also the path from the independent
variable to the mediator (path a) which we consider.

Knowledge
integration
a

b

Task
complexity

Task
performance
c

Figure 15: Mediating effect of knowledge integration

As explained in Section 5.6 (Summary of path analyses), we ran a series of
regression models which allow us to test the linkages of the mediational models. To test
for mediation, we look for the following conditions to be satisfied (Baron & Kenny,
1986): First, the independent variable must affect the mediator; second, the independent
variable must affect the dependent variable; third, the mediating variable must affect the
dependent variable.
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An approximate significance test for the indirect effect of the independent
variable on the dependent variable via the mediator was provided by Sobel (1982). The
path from the independent variable to the mediator is denoted as a and its standard error
is sa; the path from the mediator to the dependent variable is denoted as b and its standard
error is sb. The formula for the standard error of the indirect effect or ab is given by:
_________________
√(b2sa2 + a2sb2 + sa2sb2)
The significance of the indirect effect is given by:
Tab = ab/sab
Using this formulation, we derived the T values for the indirect effect between
task component complexity and efficiency as 1.59 and the indirect effect between task
component complexity and effectiveness as 1.77. These results indicate that the
mediating effect of knowledge integration on the relationship between task component
complexity and task efficiency is significant. Also the mediating effect of knowledge
integration on the relationship between task component complexity and task effectiveness
is significant. The mediating effects of knowledge integration on the relationships
between task interactive complexity and performance, and between procedural rigidity
and performance were found to be not significant. In summary the following two
hypotheses were supported:
H14a) Integration of specific knowledge mediates the relationship between task
component complexity and efficiency.
H15a) Integration of specific knowledge mediates the relationship between task
component complexity and effectiveness.
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6. Discussion
The original premise of this dissertation work was first to frame the inherent
characteristics of emergency management tasks in terms of task component complexity,
interactive complexity, and procedural rigidity. Based on prior research studies and our
empirical observations, we proposed that organizational systems that depended on such
tasks are prone to failure. This further motivated us to investigate the influence of
knowledge integration as a particular knowledge management strategy on the dimensions
of emergency task performance which we identified as task efficiency and effectiveness.
In this study we also examine the three types of specific knowledge: context, technology,
and context-and-technology for analysis of knowledge integration.
Unless otherwise cited, the examples and anecdotes in this section are drawn from
field observations and meeting notes at the Miami-Dade EOC and transcripts of
interviews and discussions with emergency officials and managers made by the author(s)
and others in the research team over a two-year period. Researchers spent 4 to 6 hours/
day at the Miami-Dade EOC at any one time as invited observers during simulation and
practice drills or actual activations in preparation for disaster events (for example
Hurricane/Tropical Storm Ernesto in 2006). Depending on the nature of the event,
observations were usually made from different vantage points as the events unfolded to
cover the appropriate breadth and depth for the research. These observations were
discussed by the members of the research team with the EOC branch managers and
officials for relevance and clarity of meaning. Examples are also drawn from the
EOC/EOM archives such as Incident Action Plans and Situation reports and SOPs.
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6.1 Relationship between task complexity, knowledge integration and performance
Our conceptualization of knowledge integration is based on the extent to which a
specific area of knowledge is shared and applied across the organization that enables its
members to better perform their tasks. We believe that this work provides one of the first
research studies in proposing that knowledge integration in emergency management
operations is necessary for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the typical tasks
undertaken in emergency operations centers. We have also demonstrated that there are
three types of specific knowledge that are required in this work. Prior research in
emergency management has typically focused on coordination mechanisms, technical
elements, and behavioral factors -- mostly originating from a motivation to understand
the vagaries of the question "what went wrong?" in adverse and unpredictable situations.
Through this knowledge-based view of emergency management, we sought to understand
the inherent nature of emergency tasks and how the integration of specific knowledge is
essential for successful emergency management.
Overall, the results support our main propositions as depicted in the research
model. Our research model seems stable and we have been able to support many of the
hypotheses that we posited in order to address our research questions. We did the
preliminary analyses on the partial dataset (about 70 responses) which included testing
for reliability, validity, factor analysis, regression testing, control variables testing, and
non-response bias tests. Similar tests on the complete dataset at the end of the data
collection phase yielded results that in general were comparable to the prior results.
At the same time we have had some surprises and we have gained new insights
based on our results and observations which we believe will further extend the theory
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related to task complexity, knowledge integration and emergency management
performance. We attempted to explain the incongruity between our expectations and the
results in various ways which included discussions with emergency managers
experienced in specific areas of operations, observations of training drills and simulations
at the EOC, and reviewing the notes and recordings from previous disaster incidents
resulting in the activation of the EOC.
The results provide adequate support for the first two hypotheses about the
relationship between task component complexity and task effectiveness and between task
interactive complexity and task effectiveness. We had proposed that these two
dimensions of task complexity will influence task effectiveness negatively expecting that
a higher degree of task complexity will tend to reduce the task effectiveness.
However we were surprised with the results for the third dimension of task
complexity, procedural rigidity, which indicate that a higher degree of procedural rigidity
will tend to improve the task effectiveness. To explain this incongruity with our original
hypothesis, we reflect upon the following quote from one of the senior emergency
managers at the EOC:
"What I was trying to get was the fact that typically, EOC personnel, those
assigned to sit in the Operations and especially members of our staff have all
been trained under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and
Incident Command System (ICS) and understand the importance of following the
structure of the two and also understand the value of a Incident Action Plan
(IAP)."
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We theorize that EOC personnel are specially trained and prepared to handle the tasks
that have been planned along the guidelines as provided by the (Incident Command
System) ICS7. Hence it is plausible that those tasks which are particularly complex in
terms of procedural rigidity (time rigidity and/or sequence rigidity) are planned in
advance during the disaster preparation phase and the associated personnel and
organizations notified and trained accordingly. This makes the activities and the interdependencies of these tasks less subtle, transparent, and therefore easier to foretell and
execute during the emergency incident.
For example, such plans are laid out describing detailed steps, processes,
dependencies, and resource and personnel requirements in the Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP) for "Transportation ESF # 1". According to the SOP, "ESF-1 provides
for and coordinates the emergency transportation needs of Miami-Dade County and its
municipalities during the preparedness, response and recovery phases of an incident or
disaster. These needs include but are not limited to the following: Assist in the
evacuation of vulnerable populations; assist the Public Safety Branch in traffic
control…" The tasks outlined in ESF-1 require the coordination not only among the three
functional branches, but also eleven other agencies which include Miami-Dade Transit,
Florida DOT, Florida National Guard, Miami-Dade Aviation, Miami-Dade Public
Schools, and others. The initiation of the evacuation tasks depend on several factors such
as tropical storm force winds, flooding, debris collection, and so on. The task
responsibilities also include evacuation support systems such as bridge lockdown and

7

The ICS is a particular approach to management of highly reliable temporary organizations that has been
employed by many public safety professionals in emergency response organizations. It has enabled the
organizations to be flexible and reliable in complex and volatile task environments.
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traffic signal reprogramming procedures. Such a task would be categorized as having a
high degree of procedural rigidity because of the stringent requirements for timing and
sequence of activities as well as coordination between the team members. Through
elaborate planning, preparation, and practice, the Miami-Dade EOC is able to execute
such tasks successfully during disaster situations.
We were able to observe a demonstration of this aspect of emergency response
during the drill and practice sessions of the EOC functional exercises. These sessions
gave the EOC managers and the participants the opportunity to test, exercise, and practice
their skills and coordination requirements for the tasks. The unexpected outcome in our
research would underscore the importance of the principles of the ICS and its
applicability to the improvement of emergency management performance. It further
whets our academic interest in our conceptual idea regarding the adaptability of highreliability organizations when dealing with complex systems.
6.2 Implications of moderating effects of specific knowledge
We present a theoretical model of integration of specific knowledge touching
upon the classification of types of knowledge and also the interrelationships between
these types. Based on prior literature (Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez 2005), our
research model has proposed three types of specific knowledge in the realm of
emergency management: context-specific, technology-specific, and context-andtechnology-specific.
We have discussed the detailed analyses for the moderating effects of specific
knowledge on the relationships between task complexity, knowledge integration, and task
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performance in Section 5.8. We present below two perspectives of the same analyses
which is a comprehensive view involving task efficiency, task effectiveness, contextspecific knowledge, and technology-specific knowledge. Besides giving us a basis for
further reflection on the findings, these perspectives serve to reveal some interesting
facets of our research which otherwise would not be easily discerned. The perspective in
Table 27 is context and technology specific knowledge viewed within task performance
dimensions of efficiency and effectiveness.

Dependent Variables

Independent
Variable
EFFICIENCY
Context-specific

CC
IC
PR
KI

Low

High

-0.062
-0.492**
+
0.320
0.008

-0.185
-0.283*
-0.187
0.322**

EFFECTIVENESS

Technologyspecific
Low
High
-0.326*
-0.456**
+
0.258
0.407**

0.004
+
-0.260
0.159
0.023

Context-specific
Low

High

0.034
+
-0.327
-0.098
0.315*

-0.379**
+
-0.210
0.229*
0.325**

Technologyspecific
Low
High
-0.411**
-0.296*
0.147
0.427**

0.089
+
-0.258
-0.015
0.096

Note:
+
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.01; p < 0.1

Table 27: Context and technology specific knowledge within task performance
We present our findings of the moderating effects of specific knowledge on the
relationship between task complexity, knowledge integration, and task performance from
the perspective of task performance. This perspective enables us to view the moderating
effects of context-specific and technology-specific knowledge on task efficiency on one
side and on task effectiveness on the other. We clarify the terminology for levels of
specific knowledge as follows: Low level and high level of specific knowledge represent
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a level of the specific knowledge less than the median value (5.33) and greater than or
equal to the median value (5.33) respectively.
We note that in general the negative impact of task complexity on task efficiency
is reduced by a higher level of specific knowledge: context-specific and technologyspecific. The impact of procedural rigidity on efficiency is greater for lower levels of
specific knowledge (or general knowledge). However there is a difference in the
relationship between knowledge integration and efficiency for the different levels of each
type of specific knowledge. The impact of knowledge integration on efficiency is greater
for higher levels of context-specific knowledge, and lower levels of technology-specific
(or general) knowledge. The relationship between knowledge integration and efficiency
is more pronounced in tasks when the integrative knowledge used is context-specific
knowledge. At the same time, the relationship between knowledge integration and
efficiency is more pronounced in tasks with relatively lower levels of technology-specific
knowledge. Management needs to be aware of the extent and type of specific knowledge
used for the task since performance can be ameliorated through the use of different types
of integrative knowledge.
The impact of component complexity on effectiveness is different for each type of
specific knowledge. The impact of component complexity on effectiveness is reduced by
lower level of context-specific and higher levels of technology-specific knowledge. In
general the moderating effects of specific knowledge on interactive complexity and
effectiveness are similar. The moderating effect of technology-specific knowledge on
procedural rigidity is not significant, but has a positive impact on effectiveness for higher
levels of context-specific knowledge. The impact of knowledge integration on
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effectiveness is greater when higher levels of context-specific knowledge were used, and
lower levels of technology-specific (or more general) knowledge were used.
From the standpoint of practical implications, the findings suggest that potentially
higher benefits can be gained by being selective in knowledge integration strategies for
tasks that require different levels of context-specific knowledge. Depending on the
complexity characteristics, some tasks may require a particularly higher level of contextspecific knowledge whereas more general knowledge is required for accomplishing other
tasks. This is evident from the example given by a senior level emergency coordinator
about locking down drawbridges in preparation for a hurricane event, which we would
classify as being high in its degree of component complexity requiring a relatively high
level of context-specific knowledge:
"There are 23 movable bridges that we are responsible for which are owned by
five organizations -- CSX Railroad, Florida East Coast Railroad, Florida DOT,
Miami-Dade County, and Town of Bay Harbor Islands. It takes approximately 6
to 8 hours to lock down and secure all the bridges and the task needs to be
coordinated between ten organizations. There may be ships in the river at the
time and some ships have unique requirements like they need a high tide… so the
timing is critical! If there is a problem then they notify (me)… There was a case
once when one of the motors for a bridge was burnt out and they needed to bring
in a crane to close the bridge…".
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The perspective in Table 28 is task performance dimensions viewed within specific
knowledge types context-specific and technology-specific.

Dependent Variables: Efficiency and Effectiveness

Independent
Variable

CONTEXT-SPECIFIC
Efficiency

CC
IC
PR
KI

Low

High

-0.062
-0.492**
+
0.320
0.008

-0.185
-0.283*
-0.187
0.322**

TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC

Effectiveness
Low
0.034
+
-0.327
-0.098
0.315*

Efficiency

High

Low

-0.379**
+
-0.210
0.229*
0.325**

-0.326*
-0.456**
+
0.258
0.407**

High
0.004
+
-0.260
0.159
0.023

Effectiveness
Low
-0.411**
-0.296*
0.147
0.427**

High
0.089
+
-0.258
-0.015
0.096

Note:
+
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.01; p < 0.1

Table 28: Task performance within specific knowledge
We present our findings of the moderating effects of specific knowledge on the
relationship between task complexity, knowledge integration, and task performance from
the perspective of specific knowledge types. This perspective enables us to view the
moderating effects of specific knowledge on task efficiency and effectiveness with
context-specific knowledge on one side and technology-specific knowledge on the other.
We clarify the terminology for levels for specific knowledge as follows: Low level and
high level of specific knowledge represent a level of the specific knowledge less than the
median value (5.33) and greater than or equal to the median value (5.33) respectively.
We point out an important consideration when dealing with emergency tasks that
are characterized by a particularly high degree of component complexity. We use the
analogy of "modularity" to explain a flexible design as a better alternative when the
degree of component complexity in a task is high. Since when the knowledge is highly
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context-specific it has a greater impact on effectiveness, the components should be more
modular or general purpose to reduce this impact. In other words, the personnel and the
organizations responsible for the task should try to share common knowledge and
communicate across organizational or functional barriers to get the job done. The
"stickiness" of the context-specific knowledge is important to correct the negative effects
of complexity; for example by using more general knowledge to understand the other
person's perspectives while focusing on the context-specific knowledge to solve a
problem.
The Miami-Dade EOC is organized along the guidelines provided by ICS. One of
the management characteristics of the ICS is modular organization, an organizational
structure which develops in a top-down modular fashion based on the size and
complexity of the incident (Anderson et al., 2004) . When situational complexity
increases, the organization is able to respond by expanding from the top down adding
functional responsibilities as required. Communication and coordination is achieved by a
governance structure which involves all three functional branches (infrastructure, human
services and public safety). As explained by a senior emergency manager:
"Mother nature does not read the rule book! The planned activities in a task
change, all agencies have to change to get back on track so everyone needs to
react the same way. The Lead Agency is responsible for a given task, the Duty
Officer (DO) is the central point to be notified, which rotates, and there is also a
manager on call…"
In general, the level of technology-specific knowledge is important to reduce the negative
effect of task complexity on the efficiency and the opportunity to introduce knowledge
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management systems (technologies as well as processes) when dealing with high
complexity tasks needs to be considered.
For example, the Miami-Dade EOC is developing the Emergency Incident
Management GIS Tool along with the Miami-Dade Enterprise Technology Services
Department (ETSD). This system will enable information sharing with many
municipalities and partner agencies in disaster situations (including hurricane, fire, mass
migration) in terms of critical facilities and their locations. It is designed to be a webbased application which can be used anywhere and is easily expandable for additional
data and functionality. The GIS Manager states:
"The purpose of this technology is to make available as much information as
possible about the location and surrounding areas of where an emergency
incident has occurred in order to give the emergency managers the ability to
assess situations in a timely and effective manner. It is simple and user-friendly
and provides accurate, reliable, and linked data…".

In the frameworks below we summarize the knowledge areas classified according
to the type of specificity at the EOC and the findings that we have discussed about the
moderating effects of the levels of specific knowledge on the relationship between task
complexity and task performance. We have used the original framework described by
Sabherwal and Becerra-Fernandez (2005) for knowledge specificity as the basis for these
analyses where each of the four quadrants represents the combination of low/high
specificity of contextual knowledge and low/high specificity of technical knowledge.
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The quadrant where the levels of both types of specific knowledge are low represents
general knowledge.
Key:

CC - Task Component Complexity
IC - Task Interactive Complexity
PR - Task Procedural Rigidity
KI - Knowledge Integration

In Figure 16, we present the conceptual framework for the moderating effects of
specific knowledge on task efficiency. In summary, the positive impact of knowledge
integration on efficiency is significant when the integrative knowledge is contextspecific. To reduce the negative impact of interactive complexity on task efficiency, the
integrative knowledge should be both context and technology specific. To reduce the
negative impact of component complexity on task efficiency, the integrative knowledge
should be technology-specific.
In Figure 17, we present the conceptual framework for the moderating effects of
specific knowledge on task effectiveness. In summary, the positive impact of knowledge
integration on effectiveness is significant when the integrative knowledge is contextspecific or general. However, this impact is more pronounced for the quadrant where the
integrative knowledge is context specific (denoted by *). The positive impact of
procedural rigidity on task effectiveness is significant when the integrative knowledge is
context-specific. To reduce the negative impact of interactive complexity on task
effectiveness, the integrative knowledge should be technology-specific. To reduce the
negative impact of component complexity on task effectiveness, the integrative
knowledge should be technology-specific.
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Conceptual framework

Contextual Knowledge Specificity

High

Summary results: Moderating effects on efficiency

Knowledge Integration

Interactive Complexity (-)
Component Complexity (-)

Low

Component Complexity (-)

Low

High
Technical Knowledge Specificity
25

(Adapted Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez, 2005)

Figure 16: Conceptual framework moderating effects on efficiency

Conceptual
framework
(adapted from Sabherwal
& Becerra-Fernandez 2005, p. 302)

Contextual Knowledge Specificity

High

Summary results: Moderating effects on effectiveness

Procedural Rigidity

Procedural Rigidity

Knowledge Integration*

Interactive Complexity (-)

Knowledge Integration

Interactive Complexity (-)

Low

Component Complexity (-)

Low

High
Technical Knowledge Specificity
(Adapted Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez, 2005)

Figure 17: Conceptual framework moderating effects on effectiveness
(adapted from Sabherwal & Becerra-Fernandez 2005, p. 302)
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6.3 Knowledge integration at Emergency Operations Center
When reflecting upon the challenges of an emergency response organization, one
might wonder how it could be possible to go through a disaster situation if the MiamiDade EOC did not exist. The EOC functioning as the "coordinating organization" makes
it possible for all the individuals, private firms, and government agencies to come
together and start functioning very quickly to respond to a particular disaster. To a
certain extent, well established policies and procedures enable the smooth working of the
EOC. For example, activation levels can be ramped up from three to one based on the
severity level of the disaster -- three indicating a lower level of severity and one
indicating the highest severity. For a lower level of severity, the urgency is
understandably less -- so fewer individuals would be called in physically for the
activation and many more would be "on call" (or stand-by status). For the highest
severity level, all the participants would be expected to be present at the EOC.
We have been able to demonstrate that many of the EOC tasks are inherently
difficult and this study has proposed a methodology for assessing the dimension and
degree of complexity of the tasks in terms of component complexity, interactive
complexity, and procedural rigidity. Further, we have shown that knowledge integration
is the means to turn things around so that the tasks can be completed successfully. Most
importantly, the structure, the technology, and the resources at the EOC provide the
necessary conditions and the environment for effective knowledge integration.
Our findings in the empirical study and field observations allow us to offer further
insights about knowledge integration at the Miami-Dade EOC. Although the integration
of technology-specific knowledge provides the required basis for solving the problems in
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the emergency tasks, the integration of context-specific knowledge is critical for the
successful execution of the tasks. In other words, the integration of context-specific
knowledge is required over and above the integration of technology-specific knowledge
for working emergency management tasks failing which the task will not be successfully
completed.
We have defined knowledge integration as the extent to which the specific area of
knowledge is shared and applied across the organization and enables its members to
better perform their tasks. We argue that the nature of planning, preparation and
execution of knowledge integration for each of the two types of specific knowledge are
different and contingent upon the disaster event that the EOC is responding to.
Discussions with one of the branch managers at the EOC helps further clarify this
notion. He explained that the Storm Action Lead Time (SALT) is an electronic checklist
of tasks that have evolved over time based on the experiences of past incidents.
"SALT deals with the 'known'. There may be situations which nobody can think of
before hand. Preparation and planning goes during the time of the year when it
is not the hurricane season. Previous year tasks are evaluated, lessons learned
are studied, and built in for the next year… this is a constant cycle. But every
scenario can be different! So we need to be resilient. Storms can speed up, slow
down, change directions… always changing. For our operations we have
different considerations depending on whether it is mid-week or week-end…"
During the months which are not part of the Hurricane season (typically
November through May), the EOC professionals are engaged in planning and review
activities. This is the time for activities such as reviewing previous plans and procedures,
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modifying them as needed by newer experiences and lessons learned, designing and
developing new technologies, and establishing new feeds to information systems. The
model for integration of technology-specific knowledge incorporates such activities
which prepare the foundation for the next Hurricane season (typically June through
November). Based on this body of (integrated) knowledge, the EOC is now prepared to
handle the emergency events in the coming season. For this purpose the next stage is the
integration of context-specific knowledge which depends on the nature and location of a
particular event.
Thus we highlight two important contingent aspects of integration of specific
knowledge other than the type of the specific knowledge itself. First, the integration of
specific knowledge includes a component for technology-specific knowledge which is
driven by the organizational and political initiatives to plan and prepare for emergency
events. It is characterized by rigorous planning and review concerned with systematized
methodologies. Second, it includes an element of improvisation that can change over
time, based on experience and on the particular organizational characteristics (contextspecific) and depends on the emergency response criteria for new events. Since some of
these tasks might not have been required earlier, it often entails creative dynamism and
spontaneity to deal with the new event.
The best professionals know much more than what they can easily express
through written or oral communication (Schon 1983). Our empirical observations lead us
to believe that to meet the challenges of their work at the EOC, the emergency
professionals in being "reflective practitioners" rely not only on what they learned in
training institutions, but on improvisation which they gain through their experience and
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reflection. In our attempt to conceptualize and explain this vital element of emergency
management, we adopted the notion of integration of context-specific knowledge. This
represents the capacity of the emergency manager to quickly grasp the nuances of an
unfamiliar situation, reflect upon past situations, communicate with other officials and
agencies, and the cumulative effort to bring the past knowledge and experience to bear on
the unique task.
According to Donald Schon (p. 242):
"…managers live in an organizational system which may promote or inhibit
reflection-in-action. Organizational structures are more or less adaptable to new
findings, more or less resistant to new tasks. … The scope and direction of a
manager's reflection-in-action are strongly influenced, and may be severely
limited, by the learning system of the organization in which he practices".

Our results suggest overall that the Miami-Dade EOC organizational structure,
managerial inter-relationships, and technological infrastructure provide the coordinating
capabilities that enable effective knowledge integration. In this regard, the Miami-Dade
EOC environment offers a fertile organizational learning system to the emergency
managers allowing them to be creative and resourceful amidst the constrained and harsh
limitations of emergency events.
6.4 Mediation of knowledge integration
In this study we view knowledge integration as an important knowledge
management strategy which creates a generative capability, allowing the Miami-Dade
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EOC to organize its structural, managerial, technological, and contextual expertise into
integrated sets of decision-making processes.
The results indicate that support was found for the mediating effect of knowledge
integration on the relationship between task component complexity and each of the two
dimensions of task performance: task efficiency and task effectiveness. Thus, integration
of specific knowledge plays an important role in improving the task efficiency and task
effectiveness of emergency tasks that are characterized by component complexity
(number of personnel, organizations, machines, computer systems, etc.). In other words,
the Miami-Dade EOC can reduce the negative impact of task component complexity on
performance by knowledge integration.
We note the comments of a senior emergency coordinator when he narrated the
key points of Initial Damage Assessment (IDA) and Rapid Impact Assessment Team
(RIAT) immediately after an emergency incident such as a hurricane and how personnel
from many different organizations need to interact -- which requires the integration of
various areas of knowledge they represent:
"Several areas of specific knowledge are required to be used to make an
assessment of how severe the impact is. The people who are called for activation
are senior enough in their organizations to make their own decisions. There is a
high level of trust…Debris assessment is done. Technology-specific knowledge
involves deciding the right equipment, how to operate the equipment, how to
prevent possible damage to other equipment (e.g. FPL); engineers need to decide
what kind of damage was experienced, how many roofs were damaged, whether
they can be immediately repaired, and so on. Rain can be an important factor
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(context-specific)… if there is flooding, then the hydrological experts need to
decide how quickly the water can be drained, since if the water stays too long it
can cause interior damage. Further, if the ground is saturated, this will lead to
flooding. The situation can be further complicated if there is any hazardous
material involved…Boil water orders may need to be given based on health and
medical considerations".
We have discussed earlier that knowledge integration does have a strong positive
impact on task efficiency as well as task effectiveness. However, the support for the
mediating effects of knowledge integration on the relationships for task interactive
complexity and procedural rigidity were not as strong as expected. A possible
explanation is that there may be other factors besides knowledge integration that may be
important mediators for the effects of task interactive complexity, procedural rigidity on
task efficiency and effectiveness. When the EOC is dealing with complex interactive
tasks (uncertain and inter-related), a possible influence they need to contend with is the
political pressure and the related media coverage of the events as they unfold. Political
pressures stemming from political goals and agendas might tend to intervene with the
EOC operations and in some cases might be imposed on them. A senior emergency
manager explained that the EOC personnel are trained under the National Incident
Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS). He continued:
"…County bureaucrats on the other hand try to deal with emergencies similar to
how they run government on a day-to-day basis. The two are not the same. Case
studies have shown that the system (NIMS/ICS) does not fail…it fails because
people try to deviate or change NIMS/ICS for their own reasons. When politics
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come into play, it does indeed pull EOC personnel away from the objectives set
forth in the IAP".
Overall, we see that the performance measures of emergency management tasks
(efficiency and effectiveness) may rest in part to the extent to which the specific areas of
knowledge required in the task are successfully integrated.
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7. Conclusions

7.1 Research contributions
The proposed research study has several contributions to academic researchers as
well as practitioners. Although a rich body of literature is available in emergency
management studies and knowledge management, little research is found on how to
combine both in an effort to understand how knowledge management initiatives can
improve emergency management. This work attempts to integrate the two bodies of
emerging literature in emergency management studies and knowledge management. We
believe this "cross-fertilization" of research streams is important to provide scholars a
more balanced and comprehensive view and strategically address the persistent issues
that are encountered in this field.
Hardly any studies were found which analyze task complexity and examine
relationships to knowledge integration and task performance. One of the major
contributions of this work will be the "unbundling" of the concept of task complexity in
the realm of emergency management. We view this as an important concept, which
having understood will allow us to develop further understanding of involved issues.
Emergency operations are organized around tasks and hence the task becomes the nexus
for their operations and useful as a unit of analysis. This study will propose a useful
method to analyze and measure task complexity and its dimensions. By building on the
general task complexity concepts, research on emergency management may provide new
insights that will contribute to the general task complexity literature and to emergency
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task management practices. We expect to open further avenues for prospective
theoretical and empirical research in this area.
Overall, this work intends to develop and test a model to enrich our understanding
of the problems indicated in earlier sections. The concepts developed and explained in
this work are intended to shed light on the link between task complexity, knowledge
integration, and task performance in emergency operations. By applying perspectives of
how system accidents occur and how specific knowledge is integrated, we expect to tap
into a solution space which otherwise would not be self-evident in this field.
The perspective that integration of specific knowledge in emergency management
operations can greatly facilitate activities through which the outcome can be improved is
a novel knowledge-based view which adds to the literature on the improvement of
emergency management. Our results show that by understanding the nature of task
complexity and the required expertise in terms of specific knowledge, emergency
managers and personnel can selectively try to improve the performance outcome of their
operations.
In this study we have examined three types of specific knowledge: technology,
context, and context-and-technology. We extend the research on general knowledge and
the typology of specific knowledge by providing a useful and effective method for
measuring the constructs for the extent of context-specific knowledge and technologyspecific knowledge. We see this as an important contribution which will allow the
further development of conceptualizations about knowledge specificity. Knowledge
integration is organized around the sharing and application of different areas of specific
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knowledge and this study provides a method to analyze and measure specific knowledge
and its dimensions.
We propose a new emergent phenomenon related to the contingency of
integration of specific knowledge which extends prior theories of knowledge integration
particularly in the realm of emergency management. Through our findings in the
empirical study and field observations, what emerged is an appreciation of the view that
the integration of context-specific knowledge is required over and above the integration
of technology-specific knowledge for working emergency management tasks. We argue
that in emergency management the integration of context-specific knowledge and the
integration of technology-specific knowledge have different characterizations. The
integration of technology-specific knowledge deals more with planning, preparation,
methodologies, systems, and training. The integration of context-specific knowledge is
facilitated by the integration of technology-specific knowledge and entails improvisation
and spontaneity.
7.2 Implications for practice
For practitioners, this research provides a unique perspective in knowledge
management, namely integrating specific knowledge in the contingent context of
emergency management. Current research has attempted to touch upon broad concepts
that apply to emergency environments in different organization settings but may not have
reached the heart of the issues that we contemplate in this study. We expect that when
policy-makers and managers are responsible for making crucial decisions, the outcome of
this work will provide useful insight and guidelines. It should help them evaluate their
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options, so that the choices they make are informed and deliberate instead of being
simply repetitious based on past experiences.
The tasks undertaken at the EOC are inherently complex and depend on many
personnel representing a variety of organizations. Our data conveys and confirms this
observation. The complexity of emergency tasks is represented along three dimensions:
task component complexity, task interactive complexity, and task procedural rigidity.
In general, our results suggest that EOC personnel use three types of knowledge: contextspecific, technology-specific, and context-and-technology-specific knowledge. This
indicates that the successful execution of the tasks requires both formal education
(technology-specific) and on-the-job training (context-specific). In addition, turnover of
personnel may compromise the EOC’s ability to utilize and integrate the specific
knowledge residing in those personnel, which in turn poses a significant concern for
effective emergency response.
Despite the high levels of complexity, EOC tasks are completed successfully
because of the effective integration of specific knowledge carried out by the individuals
assigned to the tasks. When the degree of task complexity is high, the task is more
difficult to manage and execute, which in turn makes it more difficult to succeed. The
ability of the EOC personnel and their corresponding organizations to effectively
integrate specific knowledge is essential for improving the task performance in these
circumstances. The EOC organizational structure (modeled along ICS guidelines),
technological infrastructure, and coordinators provide a fertile environment that enables
effective knowledge integration across the personnel and organizations who are assigned
to the EOC during the response and recovery efforts in a disaster situation.
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However, emergency managers need to be aware that "one size does not fit all"
and the same degree of knowledge integration need not be applied for all tasks. Our
results suggest that potentially higher benefits can be gained by being selective in
knowledge integration strategies for tasks that require different levels of context-specific
knowledge and different levels of technology-specific knowledge. The proposed
framework for specificity of knowledge is a useful tool in this decision-making process.
We also propose possible future work to advance the requirements for
systematically developing knowledge integration systems based on the findings of this
study. These systems can include technologies and information systems that support
gaining experiential knowledge. For example, experience may be gained via simulated
events as well as virtual environments such as implementing a virtual EOC infrastructure
(Becerra-Fernandez et al. 2007).
7.3 Research limitations
There are some inherent limitations in this study due to which the interpretation of
the findings and the conclusions should be treated with caution. We focused on one large
emergency response organization, the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center which
might limit the extent to which the results can be generalized. Since Hurricane Andrew
in 1992, the Miami-Dade EOC has been particularly acclaimed to have emerged as a
well-organized, mature, and sophisticated EOC as compared to other emergency
operations centers in the nation. Over the years, this organization has garnered the
respect of neighboring municipalities, government agencies, local businesses, and
research and training institutions.
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Due to the peculiar geographical location of South Florida, it is particularly
vulnerable to tropical storms and hurricanes in the late summer and fall season. The
Miami-Dade EOC is prepared to deal with a variety of possible natural disasters and
man-made threats, nonetheless its planning and operations are generally fashioned with a
heightened emphasis on dealing with preparation and response for tropical storms and
hurricanes. Hence, emergency operations centers can vary in their structural and cultural
attributes as well as their coordination and learning capabilities.
In the research design, we chose to focus on the inherent attributes of emergency
management tasks (task complexity) and the influence of knowledge integration on the
relationship between task complexity and task performance. In the research model we
have excluded other factors, which might be potentially important but this was necessary
to keep the research focused and prevent the data acquisition and analysis from becoming
overwhelmingly complex. We concentrated on the task complexity dimensions as were
relevant to this study from the theoretical perspectives of how systems accidents can
occur, and knowledge integration from the practical perspective of emergency operations
centers. Some factors that are important and can impact the task performance are the
extent of prior planning and the available support from local and state governments.
Our motivation to approach this research from a knowledge-based perspective led
us to study the influence of integration of specific knowledge on task performance. Our
expectation was that integration of specific knowledge is an important mediating factor
on the relationship between task complexity and performance. Other potentially
important considerations which were excluded from this study can be the role that the
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political leaders and local media coverage play in influencing the outcome of some
critical emergency operations.
Finally the use of a self-report measure for the dimensions of task performance,
efficiency and effectiveness might be considered a limitation of this study. We attempted
to capture additional information related to the task performance which can be considered
objective -- for example traditional questions about completion time and planned time for
the task as well as actual and planned budget considerations. However many participants
were unable to respond to these questions either because they did not have access to the
information or simply because it was not relevant to emergency tasks. For several
emergency tasks, there is no initially planned budget for completing the task. We
decided to use the questions related to each of the task performance constructs for the
measurement of efficiency and effectiveness which were intended to capture the
participant's perception concerning the items. As discussed earlier, the statistical internal
reliability and validity test results for these constructs were satisfactory.
7.4 Future research directions
We identify and describe some important potential directions for future research.
This study was based on the workings of one organization and the personnel who are
called in to participate during activations of the Miami-Dade emergency operations
center. Further research is required to be conducted in more emergency operations
centers to see whether the results of this study can be further generalized. It will also be
interesting to compare the results from studies in emergency operations centers in
different geographical locations; for example the centers that are located in the hurricane
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belt might have different characteristics and priorities than the centers located in areas
that are prone to earthquakes.
A different research methodology such as detailed case studies might help in
expanding the research model presented in this study. For example we have investigated
three types of specific knowledge which can be part of the knowledge integration process
in emergency response operations. A detailed case-study might help to unravel exactly
how the different types of specific knowledge are shared and applied for solving a given
problem. Such studies can also explore the mediating effects on task performance of
other factors besides knowledge integration. These can possibly be intra-organizational
factors such as a particular organizational structure (e.g. the ICS structure) or factors
external to the EOC organization (e.g. coordination support from private organizations).
This research was motivated by an interest in the study of complex systems as
applied to the domain of emergency management tasks. Future work can include task
characteristics that are not directly related to task complexity, for example the concepts of
task novelty and task newness. Certainly, these task characteristics can also be important
antecedents to the task performance construct.
Finally this research stream involving task complexity and knowledge integration
can be extended beyond the domain of emergency management. For example we
proposed the contingency aspects of integration of specific knowledge in the realm of
emergency response organizations. This phenomenon might also be applicable in other
environments such as firms characterized by highly complex projects or research and
development institutions, albeit in different ways.
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We believe that this study will provide a good basis as a starting point for several
of the research initiatives that we discussed above. Particularly we are hopeful that such
a knowledge-based perspective will shed more light on understanding the complexities of
emergency management operations and this research stream will prove to be a promising
direction for future studies.
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A Study of Task Complexity, Inter-organizational Knowledge Management,
and Emergency Management Performance
Arvind Gudi, Florida International University, email: agudi@aol.com
Dr. Irma Becerra-Fernandez, Florida International University, email: becferi@fiu.edu
Dr. Weidong Xia, Florida International University, email: xiaw@fiu.edu
Emergency management tasks are increasingly complex and inter-organizational.
Effectively managing various knowledge areas and organizations has become a critical
emergency management success factor. However, there is a lack of theory and tools that
organizations can use to assess task complexity and improve emergency management
success. This survey is the first-part of a study that examines how organizations can
better assess and manage task complexity and knowledge sharing to enhance emergency
management effectiveness.
Because of your extensive experience in emergency management, your input is critical to
the success of our research. We assure you that all information you provide will be
treated as confidential. We will not reveal the identities of individuals or organizations in
any reports, only aggregated results will be analyzed and reported.
The survey has three sections: (1) characteristics of an emergency management task in
which you were recently involved; (2) characteristics of a relevant knowledge area that
was used to accomplish the task; and (3) background information that will help us
segment and analyze the data. Our pilot tests with experienced emergency managers
suggest that it would take about 20 minutes to complete the questionnaire.
URL to access web-based online version of the survey:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=17zs4eQdKelpnNF_2f53skqQ_3d_3d

________________________________________________________________________
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Section 1: Characteristics of an Inter-organizational Task
1.1. Please identify one task that you were recently involved in and were responsible for
as a representative of your organization. The following is a list of typical EOC
tasks related to response and recovery efforts during an incident, such as a hurricane.
The list is not meant to be exhaustive -- it only provides some sample tasks. If the
task you were recently involved in is on the list, please check it. If not, please
specify the task (similar in nature to the sample tasks) in the space provided.
We intend to study the tasks in a range with variations in the degree of complexity
(relatively high to low). All tasks at the EOC are important; however we expect
them to vary in terms of number of people, number of organizations, degree of
interactions, and rigidity of processes.
Tasks with relatively low complexity
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Tasks with relatively high complexity

Open 311 Center/ Update web page
Accomplish EEAP Registry call down
Repair air-conditioning unit at a given
Special Needs shelter
Deliver mattresses to a given SNEC shelter,
300 needed
Supply 2 traffic display signs to FHP due to
accidents which require diversion of traffic
Comply with City request to enhance
flashlight supply request of 600 units
Other

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
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Close schools
Evacuate MMF (Medical Management
Facility) clients via STS (Special Transport
Service)
Activate DoH/Dialysis command centers
Accomplish drawbridge lockdown
Activate/ accomplish debris clearance
procedures
Inspect critical facilities for integrity
Other
___________________________________

1.2. Background of the task. Please provide your best approximate estimates.
1. How many people were assigned to this task ……………………………………………………………… _______
2. How many machines were used to execute this task ………………………………………………………_______
(Please indicate the actual number for your scoring)
3. How many computer systems were used to execute this task ……………………………………………_______
4. How many organizations were involved in this task
(These are organizations you represent. Please indicate the actual number for your scoring) ………_______
5. Which agency was leading this task …………………………………………………………………………._________________________________
6. What was the planned time for the task completion (in hours) ……………………………………………_______
7. What was the actual time required for completing the task (in hours) ……………………………………_______
8. What was the planned budget/cost for the task ..………………………………………………………….$_______
9. What was the actual budget/cost for the task ……………………………………………………………..$ _______
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__________________________________________________________________________________________
1.3. Characteristics of the task that you identified in the previous section. Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or
agree with each of the following statements by CIRCLING the appropriate number from 1 to 7. If you think the response is
"do not know" or "not applicable", then circle 4 or neutral.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Strongly
Disagree

1. The extent to which personnel involved in this task were under the jurisdiction of one organization….. 1

Strongly
Agree

Neutral

2

3

4

5

6

7

execution of the task…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. The different activities in this task provided feedback to each other during the execution of the task… 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. There was interdependence among the various activities in the task …………………………………… 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. There were uncertain relationships between the activities and the task outcome………………………. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. A change in one activity had significant impacts on other activities during execution of the task……... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. The various activities in the task were very rigid with respect to time…………………………………….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. The sequence by which the various activities were performed was very rigid…………………………… 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

(The backups can be other experienced personnel when assigned people are not available) ………..1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10. There were sufficient redundancies of machines that were required for the task………..………..…. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

11. There were sufficient slack in the time required for completing the task………..………..………..….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12. The task was completed within the planned time schedule………..………..………..………..……….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13. The task was completed within the allocated budget………..………..………..………..………..…….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

14. The task was completed within the planned number of person-hours………..………..………..…….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

15. The task was completed with efficient use of all available resources………..………..………..…….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. The different activities in the task interacted with each other in unpredictable ways during the

9. There were sufficient backup personnel in the executions of the task

(These were machines that could be used in case of failure)
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16. The task was completed satisfactorily for all participants………..………..………..………..……..……. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

17. All incident requirements were met when the task was completed………..………..………..……..….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

18. The task was completed successfully without negatively impacting other tasks………..……..……… 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

19. The task was effectively completed despite any conflicting task requirements………..……..………. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Section 2: Evaluation of One Area of Knowledge
2.1. Please identify one specific area of knowledge that you consider to be critical for performing the task that you identified in
the previous section. We intend to study three categories of knowledge: Context-specific (knowledge of particular
circumstances of time and place in which work is performed), Technology-specific (knowledge of a particular scientific or
theoretical field, which includes the rules, tools and techniques that may be used to solve problems in that area), and Contextand-Technology-specific knowledge (knowledge that is both context-specific and technology-specific).
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Examples: The following are few examples of knowledge areas for each of the three categories. If appropriate for the task that
you identified in the previous section, you may select any one of them; otherwise provide a brief description of your specific
knowledge area required for your task:
Examples of Context-specific knowledge areas:
o
o
o
o
o
o

The planned evacuation routes in a given location in M-D County before a hurricane
How to locate receiving facilities for medical facilities whose prearranged plans failed
Experience in implementation of mutual aid agreements for the continued supply of fuel for the county after an incident or disaster
Experience in prioritizing a resource request based on relative urgency
Experience in estimating the completion time (of resource request), and advising the originator and the Infrastructure Branch Director via E-Team
Other

____________________________________________________________________
Examples of Technology-specific knowledge areas:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Expertise in draw-bridge lockdown procedures based on different bridge design types & technology
Technical skill in operating particular equipment, tool, or machine to clear debris (RIAT)
How to use the High Frequency Radio System (this is the secondary communication system in case of failure of the primary telephone system)
Expertise in determining when to issue boil water orders
Calculating how loss of feeder lines and/or substations will impact consumption of electricity
Determining which additional medicines and medical supplies will be required based on new patient arrivals
Other

____________________________________________________________________
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Examples of Context-and-Technology specific knowledge areas:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Experience about estimating curfew times based on projection of arrival of tropical storm force winds
Priorities related to individuals and groups that are electrically dependent and will require preferential electrical restoration services
Procedures for shutdown of power grids to facilitate search and rescue efforts (also debris removal and road repair)
Experience in coordination and repair of the fuel supply infrastructure for different forms of transport
Procedures for staging and transportation of fuel for government vehicles and aircraft
How to coordinate tank farms in accordance with hurricane lock-down procedures
Other

____________________________________________________________________

170

________________________________________________________________________
2.2. Characteristics of the knowledge that you just identified. Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each
of the following statements by CIRCLING the appropriate number from 1 to 7.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Neutral

1 You depended on other departments for this knowledge to complete your tasks………………………... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2 You depended on other organizations for this knowledge to complete your tasks……………………..... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3 There was a written manual describing the knowledge in this area……………………...………………. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4 This knowledge could be easily expressed in the form of notes and documents……………………....... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5 Large parts of this knowledge were embodied in computer software……………………...……………… 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6 There was extensive documentation describing critical parts of this knowledge……………………........ 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7 New personnel were able to easily acquire this knowledge by talking to skilled employees………….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 Educating and training new employees was a quick, easy job……………………...……………………... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9 New personnel was able to easily acquire this knowledge by studying written documents ……………. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10 This knowledge could be easily taught through coaching & mentoring………....……………………....... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

11 This knowledge was frequently used by yourself in performing your tasks……………………...……..... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12 This knowledge was frequently used by your organization in performing its tasks…………………….... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13 This knowledge was frequently used by the EOC in performing its tasks……………………...…………. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

14 This knowledge improved your overall effectiveness……………………...……………………...………... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

15 This knowledge improved the overall effectiveness of your organization……………………...…………. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

16 This knowledge improved the EOC’s overall effectiveness ……………………...……………………....... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

17 This knowledge can be taught through formal training & education……………………...………………. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

18 This knowledge has rules specific to a particular discipline……………………...……………………....... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

19 This knowledge makes use of tools & techniques specific to a particular discipline……………………. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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20 This knowledge can be applied regardless of situational context……………………...………………….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

21 This knowledge is related to particular circumstances of time……………………...……………………... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

22 This knowledge is related to particular situations and place……………………...……………………..... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

23 This knowledge can be acquired only through on-the-job experience……………………...…………….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

24 Application of this knowledge is contingent upon particular circumstances & events………………….. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

25 Individuals in the EOC shared a common language & vocabulary related to this area of knowledge… 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

26 Individuals in the EOC recognized other individuals’ knowledge related to this area of knowledge…… 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

27 Individuals in the EOC shared common models related to this area of knowledge……………………… 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

28 Individuals in the EOC shared norms/ rules related to this area of knowledge…………………….......... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

29 Individuals in the EOC recognized who has expertise in this knowledge area……………………........... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

30 Components of this knowledge were common across individuals in the EOC…………………….......... 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Section 3: Background Information
Please provide the following background information, which will help us segment the sample to understand how the
relationship between task complexity, knowledge management and task performance varies according to the specific
context of the task. Once again we assure you that your input will be treated as confidential and no personal information
will be reported.

1 Name of your organization: ____________________________
2 Your title: ________________________________
3 How long have you worked at your current organization? _______ Years
4 Did you work in another organization involved in emergency management? Yes ____ No ____
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5 If yes, which organization? __________________________________
6 How long have you been assigned at the EOC? ________ Years
7 In total, how long have you been working in the emergency management field? ________ Years
8. Your educational degrees and corresponding fields:
Degree: ____________________

Field: __________________________________________________

Degree: ____________________

Field: __________________________________________________

Degree: ____________________

Field: __________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________
We will email you an Executive Summary of our study. Please provide your contact information below or attach your
business card.
Name:

___________________

Phone:

___________

Email address:

______________
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Sorting procedure for construct validity in EOC survey
Purpose: To qualitatively assess the face validity and the construct validity of the initial
measurement items proposed in the survey instrument.
EOC Survey: A study on the relationships between task complexity, inter-organizational
knowledge management and emergency management performance
Each measurement item has been printed on one index card. Please read each card
carefully and place it in one of the six categories based on the definition/ explanation
given below. If you feel any item does not belong to these predefined categories, then
place it in the category "too ambiguous/ unclear".
1. Task component complexity: This construct will capture the magnitude, number,
and variety of the task components. It is represented by items such as number of
personnel and teams assigned to the task, number of machines and computer systems
being used, and the number of organizational units involved in the task.
2. Task interactive complexity refers to the extent to which the different people and
activities can interact with each other. It is represented by the number of
relationships between all the elements, the number of feedback loops through which
they interact, conflicting interdependencies, uncertain links, and the speed at which a
change in one activity of the task will cascade through the system and impact other
activities.
3. Task procedural rigidity refers to the tightness or looseness in the process. It is
represented by rigidity in terms of time and sequence, the extent of component
redundancy, backups available, resource buffer/ slack and process flexibility.
4. Integration of knowledge: Integration of a particular area of knowledge represents
the extent to which that knowledge is shared and applied across the organization and
enables its members to better perform their tasks. It is represented by the extent to
which the specific area of knowledge is frequently used and how it is able to improve
the effectiveness at individual and organizational levels.
5. Task efficiency refers to the extent to which the task was completed in the required
time frame and within the allocated budget and resources.
6. Task effectiveness refers to the extent to which the emergency incident requirements
were met. It represents the extent to which the task outcome was satisfactory to the
participants, and the task was successfully completed without impacting other tasks.
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Appendix C: QSorting procedure sample results
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Sorting procedure for construct validity in EOC survey: Results

10
11
12
13
14
15
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7 Unclear

6 Task
effectiveness

5 Task
efficiency

How many people were assigned to this task
How many machines were used to execute this task
How many computer systems were used to execute this task
How many organizations were involved in this task
What was the planned time for the task completion (in hours)
What was the actual time required for completing the task (in hours)
What was the planned budget/cost for the task
What was the actual budget/cost for the task
The extent to which personnel involved in this task were under the
jurisdiction of one organization
The different activities in the task interacted with each other in
unpredictable ways during the execution of the task
The different activities in this task provided feedback to each other during
the execution of the task
There was conflicting interdependence among the various activities in the
task
There were uncertain relationships between the activities and the task
outcome
A change in one activity had significant impacts on other activities during
execution of the task
The various activities in the task were very rigid with respect to time

Integration
of
knowledge

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

3 Task
procedural
rigidity

Measurement item

2 Task
interactive
complexity

No

Date: _______

1 Task
component
complexity

Name of judge: ______________________________

Com
ment

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

The sequence by which the various activities were performed was very
rigid
There were sufficient backup personnel in the executions of the task
There were sufficient redundancies of machines that were required for
the task
There were sufficient slack in the time required for completing the task
The task was completed within the planned time schedule
The task was completed within the allocated budget
The task was completed within the planned number of person-hours
The task was completed with efficient use of all available resources
The task was completed satisfactorily for all participants
All incident requirements were met when the task was completed
The task was completed successfully without negatively impacting other
tasks
The task was effectively completed despite any conflicting task
requirements
This knowledge was frequently used by yourself in performing your tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by your organization in performing
its tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by the EOC in performing its tasks
This knowledge improved your overall effectiveness
This knowledge improved the overall effectiveness of your organization
This knowledge improved the EOC’s overall effectiveness
This knowledge was Technology-specific
This knowledge was Context-specific
(relates to particular circumstances of time and place)
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9
10
11
12
13
14
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7 Unclear

6 Task
effectiveness

5 Task
efficiency

How many different people were assigned to this task
How many machines/ computer systems were used to execute this task
How many organizations were involved in this task
What was the planned time schedule for the task completion (in hours)
What was the actual time required for completing the task (in hours)
What was the planned budget/cost for the task
What was the actual budget/cost for the task
All personnel/teams involved in this task were under the jurisdiction of
one organization
The different activities in the task interacted with each other in
unpredictable ways during the execution of the task
The different activities in this task provided feedback to each other during
the execution of the task
There was conflicting interdependence among the various activities in the
task
There were uncertain relationships between the activities and the task
outcome
A change in one activity had significant impacts on other activities during
execution of the task
The various activities in the task were very rigid with respect to time

Integration
of
knowledge

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

3 Task
procedural
rigidity

Measurement item

2 Task
interactive
complexity

No

Date:

1 Task
component
complexity

Name of judge: Judge01
07/25/2007

Com
ments

X

1.1

X

1.2

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

The sequence by which the various activities were performed was very
rigid
There were sufficient backup personnel in the executions of the task
There were sufficient redundancies of machines that were required for
the task
There were sufficient slack in the time required for completing the task
The task was completed within the planned time schedule
The task was completed within the allocated budget
The task was completed within the planned number of person-hours
Technology & other information sources were efficiently used for
decision-making
The task was completed satisfactorily for all participants
All incident requirements were met when the task was completed
The task was completed successfully without negatively impacting other
tasks
Conflicting task requirements, if any, were effectively resolved
This knowledge was frequently used by yourself in performing your tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by your organization in performing
its tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by the EOC in performing its tasks
This knowledge improved your overall effectiveness
This knowledge improved the overall effectiveness of your organization
This knowledge improved the EOC’s overall effectiveness
This knowledge was Technology-specific
This knowledge was Context-specific
(relates to particular circumstances of time and place)
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X

1.3

X

1.4

Comments from Judge 01
1.1 This question by itself appears to be an item for "Task procedural rigidity".
Observation: In the Q-sorting procedure, the questions were presented at random
and the judge did not have the benefit of the context of the entire survey. This
will not be the case when the actual survey will be conducted.
The Judge and I agreed that this discrepancy is not an issue.
1.2 This question could also be under "Task procedural rigidity".
Observation: This item was originally shifted from "Task procedural rigidity".
This is how we categorized the items based on "unbundling" the Complexity
construct.
We will observe how other judges will sort this item.
1.3 The question by itself is not clear what it will measure.
Observation: This question is an assessment of the survey participant's
perception regarding specific knowledge. The observation here is similar to 1.1
above.
The Judge and I agreed that this is not an issue.
1.4 Same comments as (1.3) above.
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9
10
11
12
13
14

X

182

7 Unclear

6 Task
effectiveness

5 Task
efficiency

How many different people were assigned to this task
How many machines/ computer systems were used to execute this task
How many organizations were involved in this task
What was the planned time schedule for the task completion (in hours)
What was the actual time required for completing the task (in hours)
What was the planned budget/cost for the task
What was the actual budget/cost for the task
All personnel/teams involved in this task were under the jurisdiction of
one organization
The different activities in the task interacted with each other in
unpredictable ways during the execution of the task
The different activities in this task provided feedback to each other during
the execution of the task
There was conflicting interdependence among the various activities in the
task
There were uncertain relationships between the activities and the task
outcome
A change in one activity had significant impacts on other activities during
execution of the task
The various activities in the task were very rigid with respect to time

Integration
of
knowledge

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

3 Task
procedural
rigidity

Measurement item

2 Task
interactive
complexity

No

Date:

1 Task
component
complexity

Name of judge: Judge02
07/26/2007

Com
ments

2.1

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

The sequence by which the various activities were performed was very
rigid
There were sufficient backup personnel in the executions of the task
There were sufficient redundancies of machines that were required for
the task
There were sufficient slack in the time required for completing the task
The task was completed within the planned time schedule
The task was completed within the allocated budget
The task was completed within the planned number of person-hours
Technology & other information sources were efficiently used for
decision-making
The task was completed satisfactorily for all participants
All incident requirements were met when the task was completed
The task was completed successfully without negatively impacting other
tasks
Conflicting task requirements, if any, were effectively resolved
This knowledge was frequently used by yourself in performing your tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by your organization in performing
its tasks
This knowledge was frequently used by the EOC in performing its tasks
This knowledge improved your overall effectiveness
This knowledge improved the overall effectiveness of your organization
This knowledge improved the EOC’s overall effectiveness
This knowledge was Technology-specific

X

This knowledge was Context-specific
(relates to particular circumstances of time and place)
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2.2

Comments from Judge 02

2.1 This question could also be under "Task interactive complexity".
Observation: This item was originally shifted as a result of unbundling the
"Complexity" construct.
We will observe how other judges will sort this item.
2.2 The use of the word "technology" keyed in the Judge to the construct related to
Integration of Knowledge.
Observation: When the survey participants have the context of the entire survey
questionnaire, this will not be the case.
The Judge and I agreed that this is not an issue.
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